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PROTECTIVE PLAN PROVISIONS FOR EMPLOYERSPONSORED EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
Kathryn J. Kennedy*
Federal case law has provided plan sponsors of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
covered plans with the ability to insert plan provisions that are
more favorable to the plan sponsor rather than the plan
participant or beneficiary (so-called “protective plan provisions”).
This Article first examines what is the “plan document” for
purposes of ERISA and what protective plan provisions should
be considered for insertion into the plan document and its
related “instruments.”

* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. Juris Doctorate,
Northwestern University School of Law, 1980. Special thanks to my research
assistants Andrew Scott and Benjamin Lee for their excellent support in this
endeavor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal case law has broadened the right of employee
benefit plan sponsors to insert plan provisions that are more
favorable to the sponsor than to the plan participants or
beneficiaries. This Article examines those so-called “protective
plan provisions,” both in the retirement and in the welfare plan
context. Before reviewing such provisions, it is important to
understand what constitutes a “plan document” for ERISA’s
Title I purposes, and to the extent there are single or multiple
plan documents, to understand what provisions should be
considered in a plan document for enforcement purposes. This
Article is divided into three parts: (1) what constitutes the plan
document and for what purpose; (2) what specific “instruments”
could be considered in the plan document or an instrument
which governs the plan, and what problems develop if those
instruments are not consistent with the plan document; and (3)
what protective plan provisions should be considered for
insertion into the plan documents and related instruments.
There are two important contexts in which the plan and
other “instruments” must be identified. ERISA provides a cause
of action under Section 501(a)(1)(B) for participants to receive
benefit payments required “under the terms of [the] plan.”1
Hence, the terms of the plan are relevant in determining such
benefit payments.2 ERISA also requires the plan fiduciary to act
“in accordance with the documents and instruments governing
the plan”3 or face a breach of fiduciary claim under the prudent
person standard under ERISA Section 502(a)(2).4 Thus, the plan
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2012).
Id. (providing a cause of action by the participant or beneficiary “to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of [the] plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan[.]”).
3 Id. at § 1104(a)(1)(D) (following documents and instruments governing the plan
is required to the extent those documents and instruments are consistent with the
provisions of Title I and IV).
4 Id. at § 1132(a)(2) (providing for a cause of action for appropriate relief under
ERISA § 409, which imposes personal liability on a plan fiduciary who breaches any
1
2
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fiduciary must know what “document and instruments”
constitute the plan document, as there are numerous
instruments that may be used in administering the plan, as well
as the terms of those multiple plan documents. There is a third
cause of action under ERISA Section 502(a)(3) that permits the
participant beneficiary or fiduciary to enjoin acts that violate the
terms of the plan or ERISA Title I, to redress the violation, or to
enforce the terms of the plan or ERISA Title I.5 This is a broad
cause of action covering claims to enforce rights under the plan,
including rights to benefits, and statutory rights.
II. WHAT IS A “PLAN DOCUMENT” UNDER ERISA?
Under ERISA’s “General Provisions,” Section 3 contains
definition provisions.6
While the section defines what
constitutes an employee benefit plan, it does not define what
constitutes the plan document or instrument establishing such
plan.7
A. Requirements of ERISA Section 402
ERISA Section 402 is the closest relevant provision
because it requires that “[e]very employee benefit plan shall be
established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument”
(i.e., the plan document).8
Under the law’s “Fiduciary
Responsibility” provisions, ERISA Section 402 mandates that
the content of that plan document include certain items.9 First,
the plan must name at least one fiduciary (i.e., the named
fiduciary) and the procedure by which an employer, employee, or
fiduciary duties to restore plan losses or disgorge any profits made through the use of
plan assets).
5 Id. at § 1132(a)(3).
6 Id. at § 1002(3).
7 See id. (“the term ‘employee benefit plan’ or ‘plan’ means an employee welfare
benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee
welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.”).
8 29 U.S.C. § 1102.
9 Id. at § 1102(a)-(b).
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organization identify a fiduciary with respect to such plan.10
Second, the plan must set forth the “procedure for establishing
and carrying out a funding policy and method” (applicable in the
retirement plan context) that is consistent with the objectives of
the plan and the terms of ERISA.11 Third, the plan must
describe any procedures for allocating “responsibilit[y] for the
operation and administration of the plan[,]” including the
procedures for allocating such responsibilities among named
fiduciaries, and for named fiduciaries to designate other nonnamed fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary responsibilities.12
Fourth, the plan must provide a procedure for amending the
plan and the identity of the person who has the authority to
amend the plan.13 Lastly, the plan must “specify the basis on
which payments are made to [(i.e., contributions)] and from [(i.e.,
benefit payments)] the plan.”14
ERISA Section 402 also provides optional provisions to be
set forth in the plan including: authority for any person or group
of persons to serve in multiple fiduciary capacities with respect
to the plan (e.g., trustee and plan administrator);15 authority for
a named fiduciary or a new fiduciary who has been designated
by a named fiduciary to carry out fiduciary responsibilities
under the plan to “employ one or more persons to render advice”
regarding its responsibilities;16 or authority for a fiduciary
named to control or manage the assets of the plan to appoint an
investment manager or multiple investment managers to
manage the assets of the plan, including the power to acquire
and dispose of plan assets.17 This type of provision is applicable
in the retirement plan context, as welfare benefits are typically
funded on a self-insured, pay-as-you-go basis or with insurance
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Id. at § 1102(a)(1)-(2).
Id. at § 1102(b)(1).
Id. at § 1102(b)(2).
Id. at § 1102(b)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(4).
Id. at § 1102(c)(1).
Id. at § 1102(c)(2).
Id. at § 1102(c)(3).
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premiums.18 However, multiemployer welfare plans may be
funded with trusts.19
Aside from ERISA Section 402, various other ERISA
provisions require certain types of plans to contain required
terms: under ERISA Section 203, pension plans must provide
minimum vesting standards, which are different for defined
benefit plans than for defined contribution plans;20 under ERISA
Section 205, joint and survivor and preretirement survivor
annuities must be provided to surviving spouses of deceased
vested participants;21 and under ERISA Section 206, the form
and timing of benefits under a pension plan are subject to a
number of caveats that must be set forth in the plan, including
anti-alienation provisions.22
Generally, in the retirement plan context, the plan
document is regarded as a single document with the aboverequired provisions, as opposed to multiple documents that
collectively serve as the plan document in other contexts. This is
certainly the case with qualified retirement plans, as employers
generally submit a single plan document for a determination
letter to affirm the qualified status of the plan document. The
Supreme Court affirmed this concept in the CIGNA Corp. v.
Amara23 decision by stating that ERISA Section 402 requires the
plan to be established by the plan sponsor who “creates the basic
terms and conditions of the plan, executes a written instrument
containing those terms and conditions, and provides in that
instrument ‘a procedure’ for making amendments.”24 The case
involved a traditional defined benefit pension plan that was

Id. at § 1102(c)(1)-(3).
E.g., Boucher v. Williams, 13 F. Supp. 2d 84, 95 (D. Me. 1998); Manny v. Cent.
States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension & Health & Welfare Funds, 388 F.3d 241, 243 (7th
Cir. 2004).
20 29 U.S.C. § 1053.
21 Id. at § 1055(a).
22 Id. at § 1056.
23 563 U.S. 421, 438 (2011).
24 Id. at 437.
18
19
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converted to a cash balance retirement plan.25 The Supreme
Court addressed the issue of conflicting terms between the single
plan document and the summary plan description, 26 which is
discussed later in this Section.
The Supreme Court has also referenced plan documents in
the plural.27 In Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. and Inv.
Plan,28 the Court concluded that a benefit claim “stands or falls
by . . . the directives of the plan documents[.]”29 The case
involved a former spouse’s waiver of her spousal benefits under
an ERISA pension plan that was not subject to a qualified
domestic relations order (QDRO).30 Under the terms of the plan,
if there were no surviving spouse or designated beneficiary at
the time of death, benefits would be distributed to the
participant’s estate.31 The issue presented was whether the plan
administrator was to follow the terms of the plan in the face of a
possible federal common-law waiver that did not satisfy as a
QDRO.32 Similarly, in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,33
the Court affirmed that ERISA’s statutory “scheme . . . is built
around reliance on the face of written plan documents[,]”
referring to plan documents in the plural.34 This was in
reference to express legislative history that stated “‘[a] written
plan is to be required in order that every employee may, on
examining the plan documents, determine exactly what his
rights and obligations are under the plan,’” (emphasis omitted)
again referring to plan documents in the plural.35 The case
Id. at 424.
Id. at 436-38.
27 See infra notes 28-36 and accompanying discussion.
28 555 U.S. 285, 286 (2009) (which allows for “‘a uniform administrative scheme,
[with] a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of
benefits[,]’” quoting from Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001)).
29 Id. at 300.
30 Id. at 288.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 291-92.
33 514 U.S. 73 (1995).
34 Id. at 83.
35 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 297 (1974) U.S. Code Cong. &
25
26
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asked whether a postretirement health plan’s standard
reservation clause constituted a valid amendment procedure for
purposes of ERISA Section 402(b)(3).36
Two other ERISA provisions refer to “instruments
governing the plan”37 or “instruments under which the plan is
established or operated[,]”38 suggesting that other agreements or
contracts could set forth terms of the plan.
Under the
“Reporting and Disclosure Requirements” sections,39 ERISA
Section 104(b)(4) sets forth certain disclosure requirements
applicable to the plan administrator. The administrator must,
upon written request of any plan participant or beneficiary,
furnish the most recent summary plan description (SPD), Form
5500 (an annual return and report of the employee benefit plan),
terminal reports, collective bargaining agreements, trust
agreements, contracts, or “other instruments under which the
plan is established or operated.”40 The latter indicates that
multiple instruments could constitute parts of the plan
document.
Under the “Fiduciary Responsibility” sections,41 ERISA
Section 404(a)(1)(D) requires a plan fiduciary to discharge his or
her duties with respect to the plan solely in the interests of the
participants and beneficiaries “in accordance with the
documents and instruments governing the plan[.]”42
The
question arises as to whether the “instruments” referred to in
these two sections are identical or whether they simply
overlap.43 In the Curtiss-Wright decision, the Supreme Court
characterized the documents subject to the disclosure
Admin. News pp. 4639, 5077, 5078 (emphasis added)).
36 Id. at 75.
37 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
38 Id. at § 1024(b)(4).
39 Id. at §§ 1021-1031.
40 Id. at § 1024 (with penalties of $110 per day for failure to comply under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)). See also 29 C.F.R. § 2575.502c-3 (2015).
41 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114.
42 Id. at § 1104(a)(1)(D).
43 See id. at §§ 1024(a)(6), 1104(a)(1)(D).
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requirements under ERISA Section 104(b)(4) as the “governing
plan documents” required under ERISA Section 402(b).44 Their
purpose is to provide a “clear set of instructions” to participants
to obtain benefits.45 However, the Supreme Court was solely
addressing the question of what constitutes the plan documents
for purposes of the fiduciary requirements of ERISA Section
402(b)(3).46
Regulatory guidance and case law may be useful in
identifying what types of instruments are to be considered for
either or both purposes under ERISA Sections 104(b)(4) and
404(a)(1)(D). Each section will be examined separately. The
distinction is important, as ERISA Section 104(b)(4) is a
disclosure requirement whereby the penalty falls upon the plan
administrator to pay a fee for failing to disclose, whereas failure
to comply with ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D) creates a participant
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty to comply with the
governing plan documents and instruments.
B. Plan documents and instruments for ERISA Section
104(b)(4) purposes
The Department of Labor (DOL) has issued several advisory
opinions on what constitutes “‘other instruments under which
the plan is established or operated’” for purposes of ERISA
Section 104(b)(4).47
Its first opinion stated that “other
instruments” include any documents or instrument setting forth
“procedures, formulas, methodologies, or schedules [used] in
determining or calculating a participant’s or beneficiary’s benefit
entitl[ed] under a[] . . . plan[.]”48 This includes any document, or
44 See Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 83 (noting that “ERISA gives effect to this
‘written plan documents’ scheme through a comprehensive set of ‘reporting and
disclosure’ requirements, see 29 U.S.C §§ 1021-1031”).
45 Fox Valley & Vicinity Const. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275,
283 (7th Cir. 1990).
46 See Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 83-85.
47 E.g., DOL Adv. Op. 97-11A (Apr. 10, 1997); DOL Adv. Op. 96-14A (July 31,
1996).
48 DOL Adv. Op. 96-14A (July 31, 1996).
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provisions thereof, that “establishes or amends the plan in
question” or that “establishes a claims procedure.”49 However, it
does not necessarily include “all contracts between a plan and
third parties who render services to the plan[,]” which may or
may not include a third party agreement.50
Most of the circuits that have opined on the “catch-all” part
of ERISA Section 104(b)(4) take a strict approach on its
construction and limit these “other instruments” to formal or
legal documents under which the plan is established or
governed. Accordingly, most circuit courts reject the premise
that other documents that relate to the plan, such as actuarial
valuation reports, are not formal legal documents.51
In Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co.,52 the Fourth Circuit
found the statutory language of ERISA Section 104(b)(4) “clear
and unambiguous,” and therefore, the court did not need to rely
upon the legislative history, nor traditional rules of statutory
construction.53 The court defined “instrument” to mean “‘[a]
formal or legal document in writing, such as a contract, deed,
will, bond or lease[.]’”54 Thus, “instruments” was defined as
“encompass[ing] formal or legal documents under which a plan is
set up or managed.”55 The Fourth Circuit rejected the minority
approach set forth in the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Bartling v.

DOL Adv. Op. 97-11A (Apr. 10, 1997).
Id.; Brown v. J.B. Hunt Transport Servs., Inc., 586 F.3d 1079, 1088-89 (8th
Cir. 2009) (stating that claim manuals or guidelines used in claims procedures are
not covered); Hively v. BBA Aviation Benefit Plan, 331 Fed. Appx. 510, 511 (9th Cir.
2009) (stating that the plan’s administrative service agreement may be covered if it
“governs the relationship between . . . the plan participants and the provider” or
“‘relate[s] only to the manner in which the plan is operated’”).
51 Brown v. Am. Life Holdings, Inc., 190 F.3d 856, 861-62 (8th Cir. 1999)
(limiting disclosure to formal documents that establish or govern the plan, not all
documents under which the plan conducts operation, thereby rejecting disclosure of
“corporation actions replacing members of the [plan’s] [a]dministrative [c]ommittee,
minutes of the [a]dministrative [c]ommittee meetings, and written communications
with” the plan’s trustee).
52 91 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1077 (1997).
53 Id. at 653.
54 Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (6th ed. 1990)).
55 Id.
49
50
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Fruehauf Corp.56 that suggested courts should favor a
presumption of disclosure under ERISA Section 104(b)(4)
because the statutory language did not support such
presumption.57 Even with its stricter test, the court in Faircloth
held that the plan’s funding and investment policies were
disclosable because “[a]s described in the [plan], the funding and
investment policies set forth [the employer]’s obligations to fund
the [plan] and explain the responsibilities regarding investing
the assets of the [plan].”58
In Bd. Of Trs. of the CWA/ITU Negotiated Pension Plan v.
Weinstein,59 the Second Circuit followed suit and construed
“instruments” for ERISA Section 104(b)(4) purposes as limited to
formal legal documents that govern the plan’s operation, in
contrast with routine documents with which the plan conducts
its operations, citing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Faircloth.60
The Eighth Circuit in Brown v. Am. Life Holdings, Inc.61 agreed
with the narrow interpretation of “instruments” to “only formal
documents that establish or govern the plan.”62 The Seventh
Circuit in Ames v. Am. Nat’l Can Co.63 concurred with its sister
circuits, noting that a contrary “interpretation would make hash
of the statutory language, which on its face refers to a specific
set of documents: those under which a plan is established or

29 F.3d 1062, 1072 (6th Cir. 1994).
91 F.3d at 654-56 (rejecting disclosure of the IRS determination letter, the
plan’s bonding policy, the ESOP plan’s appraisal reports and supporting
documentation, the minutes of the plan meetings, and the cost-sharing and trustee
expense policies, but allowing disclosure of the plan’s funding and investment
policies).
58 Id. at 656.
59 107 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 1997).
60 Id. at 142.
61 190 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting disclosure of documents relating the
replacement of the members of the ESOP administrative committee, minutes of
administrative committee meetings, or written communications with the plan’s
trustee).
62 Id. at 861.
63 170 F.3d 751, 758-59 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting disclosure of the agreement to
sell a division to a successor employer, certain division board resolutions, and names
of individual fiduciaries).
56
57
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operated.”64 The First Circuit in Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co.65
interpreted instruments as “formal legal documents that
underpin the plan” thereby rejecting disclosure of mental health
guidelines because the plan administrator “was not bound to use
them, nor did patients have any legal rights under them.”66
In contrast, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have construed
the reach of ERISA Section 104(b)(4) more broadly.67
In
68
Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp., in connection with a pending sale,
the employer informed plan participants of the replacement of
their existing pension plan with a new plan by providing a letter
with employment data used to calculate vested benefits upon
plan termination.69
Counsel for the participant plaintiffs
requested the plan’s determination letter, actuarial reports for
the past three years, benefit computation sheets, and a portion
of the purchase agreement that related to plan benefits.70 The
Sixth Circuit held that disclosure of the actuarial reports is
required under ERISA Section 103(d) to be filed every third year
of the plan, and thus are “indispensable to the operation of the
plan.”71 The court reasoned that the purpose behind ERISA’s
disclosure rules was “to ensure that ‘the individual participant
knows exactly where he stands with respect to the plan,’”
quoting the language in the Supreme Court’s Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch decision.72 The court advocated for a
presumption in “favor” of disclosure so as to assist participants
in understanding their rights.73
The court also required
disclosure of the calculation procedure without explicit

Id. at 758.
167 F.3d 53, 60 (1999).
66 Id.
67 See infra notes 68-79 and accompanying discussion.
68 29 F.3d 1062 (6th Cir. 1994).
69 Id. at 1065.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1070.
72 Id. (quoting Firestone v. Bruch 489 U.S. 101, 118 (1989), which had quoted
from the legislative history at H.R.Rep. No. 93-533, p. 11 (1973)).
73 Id.
64
65
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reasoning.74
In
Hughes
Salaried
Retirees
Action
Comm.
v.
Admin’r of the Hughes Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan,75
retirees under the pension plan requested the plan
administrator furnish the names and addresses of other plan
participants.76 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
denial for such request under ERISA Section 104(b)(4), stating
that the ordinary meaning of the statute “limits the universe of
documents falling within that phrase to documents similar in
nature to those specifically identified,” describing the terms and
conditions of the plan or the plan’s administration and financial
status.77 The court concluded that a list of plan participants
provided no information about the plan.78 Relying on the
legislative history, the documents requiring disclosure under
ERISA Section 104(b)(4) include those that permit
“the individual participant [to] know[] exactly
where he stands with respect to the plan[,] what
benefits he may be entitled to, what circumstances
may preclude him from obtaining benefits, what
procedures he must follow to obtain benefits, and
who are the persons to whom the management and
investment of his plan funds have been
entrusted.”79
The Ninth Circuit clarified its interpretation in Shaver v.
Operating Eng’rs Local 428 Pension Trust Fund,80 stating that
Bartling, 29 F.3d at 1071.
72 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Shaver v. Operating Eng’rs Local 428
Pension Trust Fund, 332 F.3d 1198, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “other
instruments” refers to “legal documents that describe the terms of the plan, its
financial status, and other documents that restrict or govern the plan’s operation”
such that itemized list of plan expenditures do not have to be disclosed because they
“relate only to the manner in which the plan is operated.”).
76 Id. at 688.
77 Id. at 689.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 690 (quoting the legislative history at S. Rep. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C. C.A.N. 4838, 4863).
80 332 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2003).
74
75
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“instruments” for ERISA Section 104(b)(4) was confined to “legal
documents that describe the terms of the plan, [the plan’s]
financial status, and other documents that restrict or govern the
plan’s operation.”81 Other district courts have allowed ancillary
documents such as a stock valuation report to measure benefits
by the value of the stock82 and a manual with charts necessary
for the calculation of benefits.83
C. Plan documents and instruments for ERISA Section
404(a)(1)(D) purposes
ERISA Section 404(a)(1) sets forth ERISA’s fiduciary
standards of care.84 ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(A) requires the
fiduciary to act “for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying
reasonable expenses of administrating the plan[.]”85 ERISA
Section 404(a)(1)(D) requires fiduciaries to act “in accordance
with the documents and instruments governing the plan” to the
extent they are consistent with ERISA, making reference to
multiple documents and instruments.86 ERISA Section 404(a)(1)
uses the phrase “documents and instruments governing the
plan[,]”87 whereas ERISA Section 104(b)(4) uses the phrase
“instruments under which the plan is established or operated.”88
A few courts have addressed two questions: whether
“instruments” under ERISA Section 104(b)(4) are the same as
“documents
and
instruments”
under
ERISA
Section
89
404(a)(1)(D), and whether ERISA Section 404(a)(1) imposes
additional disclosure obligations beyond those found in ERISA
81 Id. at 1202. (rejecting disclosure of a list of plan expenditures as they “relate
only to the manner in which the plan is operated.”).
82 See Werner v. Morgan Equip. Co., 15 EBC 2295, 2301 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
83 See Lee v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 604 F. Supp. 987, 1002 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
84 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
85 Id. at § 1104(a)(1)(A).
86 Id. at § 1104(a)(1)(D).
87 Id.
88 Id. at § 1024(b)(4).
89 See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying discussion.
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Section 104(b)(4).90
The Ninth Circuit in Hughes Salaried Retirees Action
Comm.
v.
Admin.
of
the
Hughes
Non-Bargaining
91
Retirement Plan affirmed its earlier ruling in Acosta v. Pacific
Enters.92 that any disclosure required under ERISA Section
404(a)(1)(A) was limited to information that relates to the
provision of benefits or the defrayment of expenses.93 The court
held that the disclosure of names and addresses of participants
was not required under either ERISA Sections 404(a)(1)(A) or
104(b)(4), and that it did not have to address the issue of the
relationship between ERISA Sections 404(a)(1) and 104(b)(4) as
to whether documents were not disclosable under ERISA
Section 104(b)(4), but arguably disposable under ERISA Section
404(a)(1)(A).94
The Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Plan Admin. for DuPont
Savings and Investment Plan95 had the opportunity to define the
category of “‘documents and instruments governing’” the plan for
purposes of ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D).96 In that case, a
participant died unmarried, and the terms of the plan called for
the distribution of benefits to be made to his estate.97 Prior to
his death, the participant had married and named his spouse as
beneficiary to the benefits, but upon their subsequent divorce in
which his spouse waived her rights to his benefits, the
participant did not remove his former spouse as beneficiary on

See infra notes 110-121 and accompanying discussion.
72 F.3d 686, 693 (9th Cir. 1995).
92 950 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1991).
93 Hughes Salaried Retirees Action Committee v. Administrator of the Hughes
Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan, 72 F.3d 686, 694 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Acosta v.
Pacific Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 619 (9th Cir. 1991)).
94 Id. at 694-95.
95 555 U.S. at 285, 300 (reinforcing the mandate in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)
“that a participant or beneficiary may bring a cause of action ’to recover benefits due
to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan,
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan[]’”).
96 Id. at 288.
97 Id. at 289.
90
91
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the plan’s designation form.98 The participant’s estate claimed
the benefits that had been paid to the former spouse.99 The
Supreme Court declined to rule as to whether beneficiary
designation forms were “‘documents and instruments governing
the plan’” under ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D), as the terms of the
plan and summary plan description, both of which were
“‘documents and instruments governing the plan[,]’” directed the
plan administrator to pay benefits to the participant’s
designated beneficiary.100
The Ninth Circuit recently ruled on this issue.101 In the
case of Becker v. Williams,102 a participant had designated his
spouse as beneficiary under the plan, but upon his divorce,
attempted to change the beneficiary designation to his son
through a telephone conversation instead of signing and
returning the required form as required by the plan.103 The
district court granted the former spouse’s motion for summary
judgment and declined, upon a subsequent motion by the
decedent’s son, to reconsider its judgment.104 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the beneficiary designation forms were
not “plan documents” for purposes of ERISA Section
404(a)(1)(D).105 Drawing on guidance from the Hughes Salaried
Retirees Action Comm. case, the court interpreted “instruments”
for ERISA Section 104(b)(4) purposes as only “‘those documents
that provide individual participants with information about the
Id. at 290.
Id. at 304.
100 Id. Only one court of appeals had addressed this issue prior to the Kennedy
decision. In the case of McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp. 423 F.3d 241, 245-46 (3d Cir.
2005), the Third Circuit suggested that virtually all “documents on file with the
[P]lan[,]” including beneficiary designation forms, fit within the “‘documents and
instruments governing the plan[.]’”
101 Becker v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2015).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1036-37.
104 Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, Becker v. Mays-Williams,
No. C11-5830, 2012 WL 6150561, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2012), recons’d denied,
Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for reconsideration, Becker v. Williams, No. C115830, 2013 WL 241370, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 22, 2013).
105 See Becker, 777 F.3d at 1039-40.
98
99
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plan and benefits.’”106 The court further interpreted “those
documents” as documents necessary to tell “‘exactly where [the
participant] stands with respect to the plan—what benefits he
may be entitled to, what circumstances may preclude him from
obtaining benefits, what procedures he must follow to obtain
benefits . . . .’”107 Although the Supreme Court in Kennedy
suggested that the “instruments” in ERISA Section 104(b)(4)
may overlap with the “documents and instruments governing
the plan” in ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(d), the category described
in ERISA Section 404 is even narrower than that of ERISA
Section 104.108 The court remarked that this result is due to the
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara decision, in which the Supreme Court
excluded the statutory mandated summary plan description
listed in ERISA Section 104 as a source of the plan’s governing
terms.109
As to the second issue, a few courts have addressed the
issue of whether ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D) creates additional
disclosure obligations beyond those found in ERISA Section
104(b)(4).110
The Fourth Circuit in the Faircloth decision
(discussed above) held that ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D) did not
impose additional disclosure obligations beyond those imposed
by ERISA Section 104(b)(4), but the court did not resolve the
issue as to whether the “instruments” were the same under both
provisions.111
The Ninth Circuit in Shaver v. Operating
Eng’rs Local 428 Pension Trust Fund112 held that disclosure of
certain plan expenditures was not required under ERISA
Section 104(b)(4) as “instruments,” and as such, was not the

Id. at 1039.
Id.
108 Id. at 1039-40.
109 Id. at 1039 n. 3 (citing the Supreme Court’s case of CIGNA Corp. v. Amara,
131 S.Ct. 1866, 1878 (2011) (“[T]he summary documents, important as they are,
provide communication with beneficiaries about the plan, but . . . their statements do
not themselves constitute the terms.”).
110 See infra notes 117-121 and accompanying discussion.
111 See Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 658.
112 332 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2003).
106
107
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basis for a breach of fiduciary claim, indicating that the
“instruments” covering both the disclosure and fiduciaries
standards were similar or identical.113 The Fifth Circuit raised
the issue in Murphy v. Verizon Communication, Inc.,114 but
rendered it moot, as the appellants had already received their
required relief.115 However, the court in Murphy pointed out the
tension in its prior decisions.116 In Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan of Tex.,117 the court held that ERISA Section
404(a)(1) “should not add to [a] specific disclosure requirement[]”
that ERISA already provides,118 whereas in Kujanek v. Houston
Poly Bag I, Ltd.,119 the court held that a plan administrator
breaches its fiduciary duties by withholding plan documents and
rollover information that was specifically requested by a
participant.120 The administrator in Murphy breached its duties
when it “‘failed to act in [the plan participant’s] best interest
and “for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants[,]”’ as required by Section 404(a)(1).”121
The lessons learned from this case law are as follows: to the
extent certain documents are regarded as “instruments” relating
to the plan document, the protective plan provisions discussed in
the second part of this Article should be inserted into all related
documents if the plan sponsor wishes to reduce litigation over
the issue.

Id. at 1202.
587 Fed. Appx. 140 (5th Cir. 2014).
115 Id. at 146.
116 Id. at 147.
117 198 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2000).
118 Id. at 555-56.
119 658 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2011).
120 Id. at 488-89.
121 Murphy v. Verizon Commc’ns, No. 13-11117, Appeal from U.S. Dis. Ct. for the
N. Dis. Tex. at 13 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2014).
113
114
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III. WHAT SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS SUCH AS INSURANCE
POLICIES, TRUST AGREEMENTS, INVESTMENT POLICY
STATEMENTS, AND SPDS ARE CONSIDERED PLAN
DOCUMENTS OR INSTRUMENTS GOVERNING THE PLAN?

The next part addresses the specific issues as to whether
certain documents, such as an insurance policy, a trust
agreement, an investment policy statement, and an SPD are
considered plan documents or related instruments, and for what
purposes.
A. Insurance Policies as Plan Documents
On the health and welfare side, if the benefits are insured,
there may only be an insurance policy or contract rather than a
separate plan document.122 The issue of whether the insurance
policy may constitute the plan document generally arises in two
contexts: in a cause of action for eligibility of policy benefits, or
under the standard of review for determining eligibility for
benefits, both under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B).123 The Eighth
Circuit in Ibson v. United Healthcare Services, Inc.124 held that
an insurance policy alone constituted a plan document because it
met the requirements of identifying “‘(1) the intended benefits,
(2) the class of beneficiaries, (3) a source of funding, and (4) the
procedures for receiving benefits.’”125 These four requirements
address two of the standards of ERISA Sections 402(b)(1) and
402(b)(4), namely the procedure for establishing and carrying
out a funding policy and deciding how benefits are to be paid,
but not the two other requirements relating to procedures for

122 Ibson v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 776 F.3d 941, 944 (8th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 2351 (2015) (“‘[A]n employer’s purchase of an insurance policy
to provide health care benefits for its employees can constitute an Employee Welfare
Benefit Plan for ERISA purposes.’”) (quoting Robinson v. Linomaz, 58 F.3d 365, 368
(8th Cir. 1994).
123 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
124 776 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 2014).
125 Id. at 944. (quoting Petersen v. E.F. Johnson Co., 366 F.3d 676, 678 (8th Cir.
2004)).
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allocating responsibilities for the operation and administration
of the plan, and for amending such plan.126
The typical scenario in which the question arises is in the
context of the court’s standard of review regarding a plan
administrator’s denial of a benefit claim.127 Generally, the
standard of review in a benefits denial claim is de novo, unless
the plan administrator has been granted discretionary authority
under the plan to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe
the terms of the plan.128 If there is no plan document—as is the
case for many insured welfare plans—courts look to other
related documents for such grants of discretion.129 The issue is
critical, as courts routinely affirm the benefits denial of the plan
administrator if the administrator has the requisite
discretionary power.130
If there is an insurance policy that provides for the payment
of employer-sponsored benefits in lieu of a separate plan
document, the question that then arises is whether the
insurance policy can confer such discretionary authority to the
29 U.S.C. §1102(b).
See Moberly v. Metlife, No. CIV.A. 6:06-297DCR, Memorandum Opinion and
Order at 6 (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2007); Stewart v. Bell Atl. Long Term Disability Plan
for Mgmt. Employees, No. 12 C 6175 at 11-12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2013); Frerichs v.
Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 875 F. Supp. 2d 923, 938 (D. Minn. 2012); Baker v.
Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., No. 4:14-CV-209-BLW at 6-7 (D. Idaho Feb. 23, 2015);
Cleary v. Boeing Co. Employee Health & Welfare Ben. Plan (Plan 503), No. 11-CV00403-WJM-BNB at 11 (D. Colo. July 31, 2013); Harvey v. Standard Ins. Co., 850 F.
Supp. 2d 1269, 1276 (N.D. Ala. 2012); Bell v. Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 589 F. Supp.
2d 1268, 1372 (M.D. Ga. 2008); Pettaway v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am.,
699 F. Supp. 2d 185, 198 (D.D.C. 2010); LeBlanc v. Sullivan Tire Co., 526 F. Supp. 2d
75, 79 (D. Me. 2007); Gates v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., No. 11-CV-3487 (KBF) at
20 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2014); Smith v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, No. CIV.A.
TDC-14-0203 at 4 (D. Md. Mar. 3, 2015); Parkridge Med. Ctr., Inc. v. CPC Logistics,
Inc. Grp. Ben. Plan, No. 1:12-CV-124 at 8 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 2, 2013).
128 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
129 Tuttle v. Varian Med. Sys. Inc., 15 F. Supp. 3d 944, 949 (D. Ariz. 2013)
(turning to the insurance policy itself as the plan document); Frazier v. Life Ins. Co.
of N. Am., 725 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2013) (characterizing the insurance policy as
both a plan asset and the plan document).
130 Tuttle, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 956 (holding that the plan documents, consisting of
various portions of the policy, “granted discretionary authority to the decisionmaker”
and affirming the use of that authority); Frazier, 725 F.3d at 571 (affirming the claim
denial).
126
127
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plan fiduciary.
Several circuits have affirmed use of the
insurance policy as sufficient to determine a grant of
discretionary authority to the plan administrator to avoid the de
novo standard of review.131 Four circuits have addressed the
issue of whether discretionary authority that is not present in
the insurance policy, but appeared in either a certificate of
insurance or a summary plan description, is sufficient.132 The
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits did not rely on these
external documents to confer discretionary authority when the
insurance policy was silent,133 but the Second Circuit affirmed
the grant of discretionary authority through the summary plan
description.134 However, the Second Circuit case is a pre-Amara
decision and may be decided differently today.135
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) adopted a model act in 2002 entitled “Prohibition on the
Use of Discretionary Clauses Model Act,” prohibiting the use of
discretionary clauses in health insurance policies beginning in

131 Frazier v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 725 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2013); Ruiz v.
Continental Casualty Co., 400 F.3d 986, 991-92 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming the grant
of discretionary authority to the plan administrator in the certificate for insurance);
Ross v. Rail Car Am. Group Disability Income Plan, 285 F.3d 735, 739 n. 5 (8th Cir.
2002); Cinelli v. Sec. Pac. Corp., 61 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1995); Gable v.
Sweetheart Cup Co., 35 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994); Musto v. Am. Gen. Corp., 861
F.2d 897, 900-01 (6th Cir. 1988); Shaw v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 353 F.3d 1276,
1282-83 (11th Cir. 2003).
132 Grosz-Salomon v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co., 237 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th
Cir. 2001); Shaw v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, 353 F.3d 1276,
1282 (11th Cir. 2003); Sperandeo v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 460 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir.
2006); Murphy v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 23 F3d 719, 721 (2d Cir. 1994).
133 See Grosz-Salomon, 237 F.3d at 1158-61 (where the underlying policy
provided that “‘[t]his policy and any application made by the policyholder or by an
employee make up the entire contract between the parties,’”); Shaw, 353 F.3d at
1283 (where the underlying policy stated “[n]o change in this contract will be valid
unless approved by the Insurance Company and evidenced by endorsement on this
contract or by amendments to this contract”); Sperandeo, 460 F.3d at 871 (noting
that the certificate and summary plan description were “not incorporated by
reference into the policy or plan”).
134 See Murphy v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 23 F3d 719, 721 (2d Cir. 1994)
(affirming the grant of discretionary authority pursuant to the summary plan
description and the employee information package, with no explanation as to the
terms of the underlying severance plan).
135 See discussion infra Section III.D.
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2002.136 The NAIC then amended its model act in 2004 to apply
to disability insurance policies.137 As a result, some state
insurance departments have prohibited insurers from using
discretionary clauses in their insurance policies, either health
insurance, disability insurance, or both, on the grounds that
they are illusory.138 Three circuits—the Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth—have held that such state insurance laws prohibiting
discretionary clauses in insurance policies are not preempted by
ERISA.139
Thus, such insurance policies may not grant
discretionary authority to the insurer.140 To avoid both the de
novo standard of review and preemption challenges for
employer-sponsored coverage under such insurance policies, the
policy should include a grant of discretionary authority to a
person other than the insurer, for example, the employer.141
B. Trust Agreements as Plan Documents
The next document to be considered as a possible plan
document is the trust agreement. ERISA Section 403 requires
that the assets of an employee benefit plan be held in trust by
136 HEALTH INS. & MANAGED CARE (B) COMMITTEE, 2002 NAIC PROC. 1ST Qtr. p.
175, 180-181.
137 HEALTH INS. & MANAGED CARE (B) COMMITTEE, 2004 NAIC PROC. 3RD Qtr.
(Attachment 1) “Prohibition on the Use of Discretionary Clauses Model Act,” at 673,
677.
138 See e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §10110.6(a) (2012); COL. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1116(2)
(2008); Conn. Ins. Dep’t Bull. HC-67 (Mar. 19, 2008); Haw. Commissioner’s Memo.
2004-13H (Dec. 8, 2004); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE § 18.01.29.011 (2011); 50 ILL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 50 § 2001.3 (2005); Ind. Dep’t of Ins., Bull. 103 (May 8, 2001); Ky. Dep’t of
Ins., Adv. Op. 2010-01 (Mar. 9, 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 4303 (2011);
MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 12-211 (2005); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r.500.2202 (2016); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 33-1-502 (2011); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:4-58.1 et seq. (2010); N.Y.
Circular Letter No. 2006-14, NEW YORK INSURANCE BULLETINS AND RELATED
MATERIALS (June 29, 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 742.005 (2011); S.D. Admin. R. §
20:06:52:02 (2010); 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.1202 et seq. (2010); UTAH ADMIN. CODE
r.590-218 (2012); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 284-44-015, 46-015, 96-012 (2012); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 26-13-304 (1977).
139 American Council of Life Ins. v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 608-09 (6th Cir. 2009);
Fontaine v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 883, 886-887 (7th Cir. 2015); and
Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837, 849 (9th Cir. 2009).
140 Zaccone v. Standard Life Ins. Co., No.-10-CV 00033 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2013).
141 See Fontaine v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2015).
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one or more trustees “pursuant to a written trust instrument,”
referred to as the “hold-in-trust” requirement.142 It specifies
that the trustee is to be named in either the trust instrument or
plan instrument, but may be appointed by a person who is a
named fiduciary.143 “[T]he trustee or trustees . . . have [the]
exclusive authority and discretion to manage and control the
assets of the plan” (referred to as the exclusive control
requirements).144
The terms “trust,” “trustee,” and “trust
instrument” are not found in ERISA’s “Definitions” section.145
The existence of a trust is typically seen in the retirement plan
context where employer and employee contributions are
pre-funded and are thus in need of a tax-exempt trust and,
consequently, a trust document.146 It is not necessarily found in
the insured welfare plan context, but may exist if the welfare
plan is collectively bargained.147
ERISA Section 104(b)(4) enumerates the “trust agreement”
separately from the plan document, and considers it a written
instrument under which the plan is established or governed.148
Under ERISA’s fiduciary standards, trustees as plan fiduciaries
must comply with the terms of the trust agreement or face
breach of fiduciary claim cases.149 This raises the issue of
whether the trust agreement needs to be a separate document
from the plan document or whether it can be incorporated into

29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
Id.
144 Id. (unless the plan subjects the trustee or trustees to the direction of a
named fiduciary who is not a trustee or allows the trustee or trustees to delegate
powers to manage, acquire or dispose of plan assets to an investment manager). Id.
at § 1103(a)(1).
145 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3 (2015).
146 David A. Pratt, The Past, Present and Future of Retiree Health Benefits, 3 J.
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 103, 128 (2007).
147 See, e.g., Peter J. Wiedenbeck, ERISA’s Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U.L.Q.
311, 322 (1998).
148 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) (requiring furnishing of “a copy of the latest updated
summary, plan description, and the latest annual report, any terminal report, the
bargaining agreement, trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which
the plan is established or operated.”).
149 Id. at §§ 1104(a), 1109.
142
143
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the base plan document. If the trust is a separate document
from the foundational “plan document,” it is considered a written
instrument under ERISA Section 104(b)(4) under which the plan
is established or governed.150
The DOL regulations echo the statute, but further provide
that “all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust
by one or more trustees pursuant to a written trust
instrument.”151 In an amicus brief, the DOL takes the position
that the language in ERISA Section 403, “‘all assets of an
employee benefit plan shall be held in trust[,]’” requires the
execution of a separate trust document or separate written
document governing the plan that clearly expresses an intent to
create a trust.152 Only then can a named or appointed trustee
accept appointment and exclusively hold the plan assets for the
benefit of the participants and beneficiaries.153 The Department
of Justice (DOJ) argues that because “[t]he statute clearly
contemplates the formal execution of a trust instrument and the
appointment of trustees,” and that DOJ regulations reflect that
fact, it should be afforded deference.154 The DOL rejects the
argument that the plan document can serve as a written trust
instrument because trust principles require the trustees,
beneficiaries, and trust res to be clearly labeled, and the trustee
must be appointed by express and unambiguous terms.155
Some courts have rejected the DOL’s position and have held
that the trust need not be a separate stand-alone document, but
instead could be incorporated in the base plan document.156 In

Id. at § 1024(b)(4).
29 C.F.R. § 2550.403a-1(a) (2015) (emphasis added).
152 See Brief Sec’y of Labor as amicus curiae in support of Appellant at 8-9,
Barboza v. Cal. Ass’n of Prof’l Firefighters, 651 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 1115472, 11-16024, 11-16081, 11-16082).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 8 (“[T]he statute clearly contemplates the formal execution of a trust
instrument and the appointment of trustees, as the Secretary’s regulations reflect.”).
150
151
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the case of Barboza v. Cal. Ass’n of Prof’l Firefighters,157 the
Ninth Circuit rejected the DOL’s interpretation and allowed the
plan document to be the written instrument establishing the
trust relationship, thus naming the defendant as trustee.158
Relying on trust law, the terms “trust” and “trustee,” which are
not defined under ERISA, are defined by the legal relationship
that exist either expressly or implicitly between a person or an
entity who is “bound to deal with property over which he has
control for the benefit of certain persons[,]” and the beneficiaries
have the ability to enforce that obligation.159
The court
expressly rejected the DOL’s argument that the “hold-in-trust”
requirement mandates the creation of a document that has the
“express words of trust.”160 Under the facts of the case, the plan
document created the trust relationship and named the trustee,
which was sufficient for purposes of ERISA Section 403 and its
related regulations.161 The court concluded that it may be
“better practice” to have used “express words of trust, and
clearly label the trustees, beneficiaries, and the trust res,” but
Congress did not mandate such a requirement.162
C. Investment Policy Statements as Plan Documents
The next document that may establish or govern the plan
document is the plan’s investment policy statement (IPS). The
purpose of an IPS is to aid the investment committee of a plan in
supervising, monitoring, and evaluating the management of the
plan, including its investments.163 This is certainly important
782 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1078 (quoting Walter G. Hart, What is a Trust?, 15 L.Q. REV. 294, 301
(1899)).
159 Id. at 1079.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1080.
162 Id. at 1079.
163 See 1 STUART D. ZIMRING ET AL., Fundamentals of Special Needs Trusts, §
7.02[3][D] (Matthew Bender 2016); see, e.g., Hall v. Nat’l City Bank of Pa., 2010 WL
1405443 at *2 (“The stated purpose of the IPS was ‘to assist the Adviser [Chiampou]
and Client [plaintiff] in effectively supervising, monitoring and evaluating the
157
158
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when a plan appoints outside investment managers to invest
some or all of the plan assets. The IPS generally provides
criteria to select, monitor, evaluate, and compare the
performance results of a plan’s investment options, using rate-ofreturn and risk characteristics.164
While it is considered “best practice” for a retirement plan
to have an IPS,165 ERISA does not require that a plan adopt an
IPS.166 If a plan adopts an IPS, the DOL applies a rigid view
that the IPS then becomes part of the binding plan document
that is subject to the fiduciary requirements of ERISA Section
404(a)(1)(D).167
Under a DOL Interpretative Bulletin, the
organization defined a “‘statement of investment policy [as] a
written statement that provides the fiduciaries who are
responsible for plan investments with guidelines or general
instructions concerning various types or categories of investment
management decisions, which may include proxy voting
decisions.”168 As a result, a statement of investment policy
issued by a named fiduciary to appoint investment managers
would be “part of the ‘documents and instruments governing the
plan’ within the meaning of ERISA Sec[tion] 404(a)(1)(D).”169
As noted earlier, the Fourth Circuit in its Faircloth decision
held that the plan’s funding policy and investment policies were
investment of the Client's assets.’”).
164 See, e.g., Americans for the Arts v. Ruth Lily Charitable Remainder Annuity
Trust #1, 855 N.E.2d 592, 595 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“National City had formulated a
draft Investment Policy Statement for the CRATs, the purpose of which was ‘to
identify and present the investment objectives, investment guidelines and
performance measurement standards’ for the CRATs’ assets”).
165 See JAMES E. ANDERSON, ROBERT G. BAGNALL & MARIANNE K. SMYTHE,
INVESTMENT ADVISERS: LAW & COMPLIANCE § 15.09[3][a] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.
2016).
166 See id.
167 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (2015) (“Statements of investment policy issued by a
named fiduciary authorized to appoint investment managers would be part of the
‘documents and instruments’ governing the plan”). See also Brief for Sec’y of Labor as
amicus curiae in Support of Appellant at 26, Barboza v. Cal. Ass’n. of Prof’l.
Firefighters, 651 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-15472, 11-16024, 11-16081, 1116082).
168 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (2015).
169 Id.
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subject to disclosure under ERISA Section 104(b)(4) because
they set forth the employer’s obligations to fund the plan, which
was an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), and explained
the responsibilities regarding investment of assets of the
ESOP.170 As such, they were “formal documents under which
the ESOP [was] managed.”171
While the Fifth Circuit recently ruled that an IPS was not
an “instrument” for purposes of ERISA Section 104(b)(4) under
the facts of that case, it did not rule out that investment
guidelines could be such “instruments.”172 The Fifth Circuit
agreed with the majority of the circuits in its construction of the
catchall provision of ERISA Section 104(b)(4) with its narrow
approach.
However, the appellants in the case did not
specifically plead that the guidelines in question were binding on
the plans at issue, nor attached to the complaint portions of the
plan; they also did not question if the guidelines had a
mandatory effect.173 The court emphasized that its holding was
consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Faircloth
regarding the investment policies in that case because “the plan
contemplate[d] the establishment of funding and investment
policies.”174 The Fifth Circuit also rejected the application of the
DOL regulations stating that “‘[s]tatements of investment policy
issued by a named fiduciary authorized to appoint investment
managers would be part of the “documents and instruments
governing the plan[,]”’” as those regulations were construing
ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D), and not ERISA Section 104(b)(4).175
The Fifth Circuit concluded that disclosure under ERISA Section
404(a)(1)(D) is “broader” than ERISA Section 104(b)(4) as it
“may not necessarily be limited to formal legal documents.”176
Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 656.
Id.
172 See Murphy v. Verizon Commc’ns, No. 13-11117, Appeal from U.S. Dis. Ct. for
the N. Dis. Tex. (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2014).
173 Id. at 145.
174 Id. (quoting Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 656 (4th Cir. 1996)).
175 Murphy, No. 13-11117.
176 Id. at 145-46 (referring to BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 587 (10th ed. 2014)
170
171
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Whether an IPS can be a “document” governing the plan for
purposes of ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D) is an open issue, as the
circuit courts are not uniform in their treatment of IPSs as plan
documents for fiduciary purposes.177 The Second Circuit in the
case of Dardaganis v. Grace Capital Inc.178 affirmed the district
court’s finding of a breach of fiduciary duties to the Grace
Capital, Inc. (GCI) fund because the registered investment
advisor, president, chief executive officer, and principal
shareholder of GCI deviated from the written agreement that
governed GCI's actions as the investment manager of the fund’s
assets.179
In the terms of the investment management
agreement between the trustees and GCI, the latter “promised to
manage the [Fund’s] Account in strict conformity with the
investment guidelines promulgated by the Trustees from time to
time and with all applicable Federal and State laws and
regulations.”180 The district court held that ERISA Section
404(a)(1)(D) required one to “abide by the plan documents
together with the Agreement’s provision that GCI manage the
account in strict conformity with the investment guidelines”
and resulted in a holding that “[a]ny violation of the terms of
[the] [a]greement constitutes a breach of . . . fiduciary duty[.]”181
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the argument, at the
summary judgment stage, that there was still a dispute as to
whether GCI violated the guidelines set forth in the agreement,
as it was apparent that GCI had not complied with the
guidelines.182 The court also rejected the claim that a fiduciary’s
failure to abide by the plan documents was not necessarily a
breach of duty because that liability required the conduct not to

(defining “document” as “[s]omething tangible on which words, symbols, or marks are
recorded”)).
177 See infra notes 178-207 and accompanying discussion.
178 889 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1989).
179 Id. at 1240.
180 Id. at 1239 (with four sets of guidelines limiting GCI’s investment discretion).
181 Id.
182 Id. at 1240.
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be prudent under the circumstances.183
The Ninth Circuit in its Ca. Ironworkers Field Pension
Trust v. Loomis Sayles & Co.184 case agreed with the Second
Circuit’s Dardaganis decision in holding that a plan’s written
statements of investment policy, to the extent the plan is
consistent with the provisions of ERISA, could constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty.185 Under the facts of the case, the
parties agreed that the trusts in question were ERISA employee
benefit plans, and that Loomis’ management of the trust funds
was governed both by ERISA and the trusts’ investment
guidelines.186 However, upon review of the actions of Loomis as
an investment manager, the court affirmed the lower court’s
ruling that Loomis did not violate the actual terms of the written
investment guidelines, and would not impose fiduciary liability
even if Loomis had failed to comply with the “spirit” of those
guidelines.187
In the 2007 district court opinion Alco Industries, Inc. v.
Wachovia Corp.,188 Alco sponsored two defined benefit pension
plans and hired an investment manager, Wachovia, to manage
some of the plans’ assets.189 Alco adopted a formal investment
policy statement calling for a specific investment strategy.190 In
a suit by Alco against another plan fiduciary for breach of
fiduciary duty, the court simply stated that investment strategy
statements are “plan documents” for investment managers to
follow when exercising their discretion, citing ERISA Section

Id. at 1241-42.
259 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2001).
185 Id. at 1042 (citing Dardaganis v. Grace Capital, Inc., 889 F.2d 1237, 1241-42
(2d Cir. 1989)).
186 Id. at 1041 (such “guidelines required that [the] investment managers inform
the Trustees of significant changes in investment strategy, adhere to the ‘prudence’
rule, maintain sufficient liquidity to meet current cash needs, and obey the
instructions of the Trustees.”).
187 Id. at 1043.
188 527 F. Supp. 2d 399 (E.D. Penn. 2007).
189 Id. at 403.
190 Id. at 404.
183
184
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404(a)(1)(D).191
In contrast, a Fifth Circuit decision in Kirschbaum v.
Reliant Energy, Inc.192 appears to reject the premise that a
statement of investment policy constitutes a plan document for
ERISA fiduciary purposes.193 The facts in that case involved an
ESOP plan where the funds were to be invested almost
exclusively in Reliant Energy, Inc. (REI) common stock.194 REI,
as the named fiduciary to the plan, directed the plan trustee
through a statement of investment policy, detailing how the
plan’s investments would be managed.195 The case involved a
breach of fiduciary claim, as the participants’ individual
accounts were invested almost entirely in employer common
stock while the value of the stock continued to decline.196 In
reference to details about a small, short-term cash component for
the fund in the investment policy, the court remarked that the
investment policy was “albeit not a constitutive Plan
document[.]”197 Later, the Fifth Circuit had another occasion to
discuss the status of IPSs in the context of both ERISA Sections
104(b)(4) and 404(a)(1)(D).198 As discussed earlier, the court
held IPSs were not “instruments” for purposes of disclosure
under ERISA Section 104(b)(4), but it failed to resolve whether
they were “instruments” under ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D), as
the issue was moot under the facts of that case.199
More recently, the Eighth Circuit in Tussey v. ABB, Inc.200
reserved judgment as to whether an IPS is a binding plan
Id.
526 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2008).
193 Id. at 252.
194 Id. at 250.
195 Id. at 251-52 (the investment policy outlined the investment objectives of the
plan, the funding requirements, the target allocation of long-term assets, monitoring,
and performance guidelines).
196 Id. at 247.
197 Id. at 250.
198 Murphy v. Verizon Commc’ns, No. 13-11117, Appeal from U.S. Dis. Ct. for the
N. Dis. Tex. at 2 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2014).
199 Id. at 11.
200 746 F.3d 327 (8th Cir. 2014).
191
192
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document for purposes of ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D).201 The
lower court held that ABB breached its fiduciary duty to the
plan by failing to monitor recordkeeping costs of the plan’s
assets and for failing to comply with the plan’s IPS, which stated
“at all times, [Alliance] rebates will be used to offset or reduce
the cost of providing administrative services to plan
participants.”202 The employer, AAB, had created an IPS for
purposes of selecting, deselecting, and monitoring investments
offered under the plan, which required a specific process to
follow when deselecting a fund.203 The district court held that
the IPS was a governing plan document for purposes of ERISA
Section 404(a)(1)(D), citing the DOL’s Interpretive Bulletin
Relating to Written Statements of Investment Policy.204
Because “the IPS specifically require[d] that revenue sharing be
used to offset or reduce the cost of providing administrative
services to [p]lan participants[,]” ABB failed to comply and
thereby did not act prudently in discharging its duties.205 In
vacating the district court’s ruling, the Eighth Circuit cautioned
that it did not wish to construe all IPSs as binding plan
documents so as to discourage their use, but questioned whether
the IPS at issue—“informally implemented to provide a
framework for administering the Plan itself”—would be a
binding plan document.206 As the district court previously found
breaches of the duties of loyalty and prudence independent of
the IPS, the Eighth Circuit did not have to answer this
question.207
Given the uncertainty under existing case law, the best
approach from the plan sponsor’s and fiduciary’s perspective is
to frame the IPS as a document that provides flexible guidance

201
202
203
204
205
206
207

Id. at 344 n. 5.
Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 52 EB Cases 2826 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Tussey, 746 F.3d at 334 n.5.
Id.
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and that permits the fiduciaries to exercise their independent
discretion and judgment based on the totality of the
circumstances. An IPS that contains numerous specificities and
requires rigid adherence to those specificities subjects the plan
fiduciaries to potential liability to the terms of the plan
document and related instruments.
D. Summary Plan Descriptions as Plan Documents
The last document that may constitute a plan document is
the Summary Plan Description (SPD). The Supreme Court in
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara208 confronted this issue in the context of
a conversion from a traditional defined benefit plan to a cash
balance plan with conflicting and misleading terms set forth in
the plan’s SPD.209
CIGNA had created a separate plan
document, as a prior plan had been terminated and a new plan
created, as well as a separate SPD, each functioning on its
own.210
The district court held the SPDs and summary
of material modifications (SMM) to have violated ERISA
Sections 102(a), 104(b), and 204(h), and thus, used the
misrepresentations to reform the terms of the new plan so as to
authorize
reformed
benefits
under
ERISA
Section
211
502(a)(1)(B).
In its amicus brief, the Solicitor General argued that the
plan terms as written included the SPD’s terms, and thus the
terms of these summaries were the terms of the plan.212 The
Supreme Court rejected this approach in interpreting ERISA
Section 502(a)(1)(B), as they were “‘enforc[ing]’ the ‘terms of the

563 U.S. 421 (2011).
Id.
210 Id. at 421.
211 See Amara v. CIGNA Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D.Conn. 2008), aff’d 348
Fed. Appx. 627 (2d Cir. 2009) (unpub. opin.), vacated 563 U.S. 421 (2011).
212
See Brief for the Sec’y of Lab. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent-Appellee, CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011),
available at https://www.dol.gov/sol/media/briefs/amara%28A%29-9-22-2011.htm
[https://perma.cc/JL4K-WHXC].
208
209
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plan,’” not changing them as the district court had.213 The Court
stated that it “cannot agree that the terms of statutorily
required plan summaries (or summaries of plan modifications)
necessarily may be enforced (under § 502(a)(1)(B)) as the terms
of the plan itself[,]” even if the lower court had viewed the
summaries as plan terms, which the Court said it did not.214
In reaching its decision, the Court relied on three
principles.215
First, ERISA Section 102 requires plan
administrators to furnish SPDs, which “suggest that the
information about the plan provided by [the SPD] is not itself
part of the plan.”216 Second, if the SPD was regarded as part of
the plan, it would then grant authority to the plan administrator
to establish plan terms, which is a function that should be
limited to the plan sponsor and is similar to a trust’s settlor.217
The Court went on to say that ERISA distinguishes the roles of
plan sponsor and plan administrator, and does not intend to
provide the administrator with the power to alter the plan terms
“indirectly” by including them in the SPD.218 Finally, the court
held that SPDs are intended to be a “clear, simple
communication.”219 Making them part of the plan document
“could well lead plan administrators to sacrifice simplicity and
comprehensibility in order to describe plan terms in the
language of lawyers.”220 Such result would lead to complexity
and defeat the “fundamental purpose of the summaries.”221
The Court concluded by saying that the SPDs were “the
summary documents . . . [that] provide communication with
beneficiaries about the plan, but that their statements do not
See CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 436-37.
Id. at 436.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 437 (citing Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,
514 U.S. 73, 81-85 (1995)).
219 Id.
220 Id. at 437.
221 Id.
213
214
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themselves constitute the terms of the plan[.]”222 Under the facts
of the case, there were two documents—a separate retirement
plan document and a separate summary plan description.223
Amara resolved the issue of whether the terms of the SPD
could no longer trump the conflicting terms of the plan
document, but left open the question of whether the terms of the
SPD can ever constitute the terms of the plan.224
Post-Amara, several circuit and district courts have wrestled
with the issue as to whether the terms of the SPD are
enforceable.225 In cases where the governing plan documents
explicitly incorporate the SPD or other plan-related documents
into the plan, the SPD has been held to be enforceable.226
The First Circuit in Tetreault v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
addressed the issue of the long-term disability plan, as
the case expressly incorporated the terms of the SPD by
reference, thereby including the SPD’s appeals deadline.228
Thus, the “beneficiary’s failure to meet that deadline” could
serve to bar her from challenging an adverse benefit decision.229
The court did not find the Amara case applicable because Amara
was silent on the issue of whether the terms of the SPD are
enforceable under a fact pattern like this case.230 While the SPD
as a stand-alone document could not create rights and duties
under the plan, the court held that “Amara pose[d] no automatic
bar to a” plan incorporating the terms contained in the SPD.231
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in the case of
Co.,227

Id. at 438.
See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 534 F. Supp. 2d 288, 310 (D. Conn. 2008).
224 See CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 421.
225 See infra notes 227-267 and accompanying discussion.
226 See infra notes 227-234 and accompanying discussion.
227 769 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2014).
228 Id. at 54.
229 Id. at 57.
230 Id. at 56.
231 Id. (citing Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 663 F.3d
1124, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011)); Langlois v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 833 F. Supp. 2d 1182,
1185-86 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Henderson v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 2:11CV-187, 2012 WL 2419961, at *5 (D. Utah June 26, 2012).
222
223
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Johnson v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.,232 where the
insurance policy incorporated the SPD and the Certificate of
Insurance as part of the policy.233 As the SPD contained the
necessary language to confer discretionary authority to the plan
administrator, discretion was thereby granted.234
Other cases go beyond this to enforce the terms of the SPD
as long as they do not conflict with the plan.235 In a case
regarding whether the plan had ambiguous language that
affected the plan administrator’s discretionary authority, the
Eighth Circuit reviewed the language of the SPD to clarify the
plan’s language.236 As authority, the court cited the DOL
regulations that required SPDs to describe “all claims
procedures.”237 In an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit
held that the SPD can be a document or instrument governing
the plan and that the statements are binding, even though its
language did not constitute the terms of the plan.238
If there is no plan document and the SPD is the sole
document, or if the plan serves as both the plan document and
775 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 988.
234 Id. But compare Bowers v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 21 F. Supp. 3d
993, 1000-01 (D. Minn. 2014) (where the SPD stated it was not a part of the
insurance contract and would not “waive or alter” the terms of the policy, its
discretion-granting language could not be used where the unambiguous plan did not
have such discretionary language) and Brown v. Life Insurance Co. of North
America, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1125, (D. Nev. 2014) (holding that the SPD’s discretionary
language did not apply where it was not part of the insurance contract and where it
stated that it did not “alter or waive” the terms of the policy).
235 See infra notes 236-238 and accompanying discussion.
236 See Prezioso v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 748 F.3d 797, 804 (8th Cir.
2014).
237 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R § 2560.503-1(b)(2), cross-referencing § 2520.102-3).
238 Liss v. Fidelity Emp’r Servs. Co., 516 Fed. Appx. 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2013).
E.g., L & W Associates. Welfare Ben. Plan v. Estate of Terance R. Wines, (E.D. Mich.
Jan. 13, 2014) (holding that the SPD is the plan document where no formal plan
document exists) and Board of Trustees v. Moore, 800 F.3d 214, 219 (6th Cir. 2015)
(holding that the SPD is a binding plan document that sets forth the enforceable
subrogation terms). But see Oldoerp v. Wells Fargo & Co. Long Term Disability
Plan, 500 Fed. Appx. 575, 576-77 (9th Cir. 2012) (refusing to enforce the grant of
discretionary authority to the plan administrator in the SPD because the plan, which
consisted of the group policy, the Certificate of Insurance, and amendments to the
policy, did not confer such discretion).
232
233
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the SPD, the courts thus far have enforced the terms of the
SPD.239 In the Tenth Circuit’s case of Eugene v. Horizon Blue
Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey,240 the plaintiff appealed the
lower court’s use of the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review in a benefits denial claim.241 The plaintiff argued that
under Amara, the SPD was simply a summary of the plan and
could not itself be part of the plan.242 The plaintiff made two
arguments: (1) the record did not include documents governing
the plan, and thus could not verify that the grant of discretion
with the SPD was valid; and (2) the grant of discretionary
authority solely from the SPD was insufficient.243 The Tenth
Circuit read Amara to apply in two different contexts: (1) the
terms of the SPD are unenforceable as they conflict with the
plan document, or (2) the SPD creates terms that are not
authorized or reflected in the governing plan documents.244
Neither of those situations existed in Eugene because the SPD
was part of the plan.245 The SPD stated in its introduction “that
it “along with the individual ‘Certificate of Coverage . . . form[s]
[the] Group Insurance Certificate;’ that it ‘is made part of the
Group Policy;’ and that ‘[a]ll benefits are subject in every way to
the entire Group Policy, which includes’ the SPD.”246 Because
the SPD unequivocally stated that it was part of the plan, the
court could review its language to see if it granted discretion to
the plan administrator in reviewing benefit claims.247 Finding
that it did, the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling.248

239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248

See infra notes 240-267 and accompanying discussion.
663 F.3d 1124, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 1131.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Eugene, 663 F.3d at 1132.
Id.
Id. at 1133.
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Other district and circuit courts have affirmed this result.249
The Sixth Circuit in Board of Trustees of the National Elevator
Industry Health Benefit Plan v. Moore250 upheld the SPD’s
subrogation provision when the SPD was held to be the binding
plan document.251 The case involved a trust agreement that
authorized the trustees to adopt a written welfare benefits
plan.252 Instead of drafting a separate plan document, the
trustees approved an SPD, which functioned as both the ERISA
plan and the SPD under the terms provided.253 The court noted
two unreported cases in the Third and Eleventh Circuits that
were called to review the same SPD at issue in this case and
recognized that the SPD functioned as the plan in lieu of a
separate plan document.254
A district court ruling in Langlois v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co.255 affirmed the use of the arbitrary and capricious standard
of review in a benefits denial claim, even though it was found in
the SPD.256 While the plaintiff argued that language in the SPD
was insufficient to grant a finding of discretionary authority
because it was not the plan, the court declined to read Amara as
precluding any reliance on the SPD in determining deference.257
Instead, the court interpreted Amara to permit the enforcement
of the terms of the SPD, provided they did not conflict with the
terms of the plan.258 As the defendant’s counsel stated, there
could be other documents “associated with the Plan,” and the

See infra notes 250-267 and accompanying discussion.
800 F.3d 214, 219 (6th Cir. 2015)
251 Id. at 219.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 220.
254 Id. (citing Bd. of Trustees of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Ben. Plan v.
Montanile, 593 Fed. Appx. 154 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1405 (2015) and
Bd. of Trustees of the Nat’l Elevator Inds. Health Ben. Plan v. Montanile, 593 Fed.
Appx. 903, 910 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S.Ct. 1700 (2015)).
255 833 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
256 Id. at 1186.
257 Id. at 1185.
258 Id. at 1185-86.
249
250
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defendant accordingly treated the SPD as the plan.259 Thus, the
court affirmed the grant of discretionary authority to the plan
administrator due to the terms of the SPD.260
The district court in the case of L&W Associates Welfare
Benefit Plan v. Estate of Terance R. Wines261 reached a similar
conclusion, stating that “Amara does not support the broad
proposition . . . that [a summary-document] can never serve as
an ERISA plan document.”262 The district court in Jenkins v.
Grant Thornton LLP,263 also affirmed that a Booklet-Certificate
was a plan document because there was no separate long-term
disability plan.264 In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Silva v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.265 held that under the facts of its case
the plan could not function as both the plan and the SPD
because the length and complexity of the language of the plan
could not be understood by “the average plan participant.”266 As
such, it did not constitute “clear” and “simple” communication as
required under the statute for an SPD.267
Summary Plan Descriptions remain important documents
for other reasons. The Eighth Circuit in the case of Silva v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.268 held that there could be a breach of
fiduciary duty claim if the plan administrator failed to distribute
the correct SPD by withholding information regarding

Id. at 1186.
Id. at 1185-86.
261 No. 12-CV-13524 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 2014).
262 Id. at *6.
263 No. 0:13-CV-60957 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2015).
264 Id.
(citing to an Eleventh Circuit unpublished opinion, Bd. of Trustees of
Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Ben. Plan v. Montanile, 593 Fed. Appx. 903, 910 (11th
Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded, 644 Fed. Appx. 984 (11th Cir. 2016), which stated
“‘Amara only precludes courts from enforcing summary plan descriptions, pursuant
to § 1132(a)(1), where the terms of that summary conflict with the terms specified in
other, governing documents. However, the Amara Court had no occasion to consider
whether the terms of a summary plan description are enforceable where it is the only
document . . . .’”).
265 762 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2014).
266 Id. at 721.
267 Id.
268 762 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2014).
259
260
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enrollment in the plan.269 In summary, the documents that
govern a plan may be numerous and the terms of each
instrument are important in determining how the plan is to be
administered, and should themselves contain protective
provisions as applicable. The case law also highlights the
importance of consistency between the terms of the plan and the
terms of the SPD.270
For a self-insured welfare plan, the plan sponsor could
consider a combination SPD plan document, but he or she should
state that the SPD serves as the official plan document. If the
welfare plan “wraps” around a vendor’s booklet, for example, by
incorporating all of a group insurance policies’ booklets that
provide welfare benefits to employees, the wrap plan document
should set forth those administrative provisions that rarely
change. Additionally, the plan sponsor should incorporate by
reference an SPD that is updated on a regular basis and the
summary material modifications that have been provided since
the last distributed SPD. Plan sponsors will need to engage the
vendor in any changes made to the plan document that deviate
from a vendor’s booklet.
IV. PROTECTIVE PLAN PROVISIONS TO CONSIDER FOR
INSERTION
While ERISA Section 402 mandates that certain provisions
must be included in a plan document, there are a number of
optional provisions that can be inserted in the plan document
that are enforced by the courts.271 The provisions discussed in
this Part include grants of discretionary powers to review benefit
claims, interpret the terms of the plan, and make factual
findings; subrogation and reimbursement provisions; standing
269 Id.
See also Thomas v. CIGNA Group Ins., No. 1:09-CV-05029 (E.D.N.Y.
2015) (stating that posting the SPD on a company’s website without prior notice is
not an acceptable method of distribution under the DOL’s regulations as it is similar
to placing materials in an area frequented by participants).
270 See supra notes 236-267 and accompanying discussion.
271 29 U.S.C. § 1102.
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for out-of-network providers; statute of limitations for benefit
claims or non-fiduciary claims brought under ERISA Section
502(a)(3); arbitration clauses and class waivers; venue locations
for a cause of action under Title I of ERISA; and the settlor
rights to amend, terminate, or modify the terms of the plan.272
As the courts have allowed plan sponsors to craft these
provisions in favor of the plan sponsor to reduce the costs of
litigation,273 plan sponsors should consider modifying the terms
of the plan to take advantage of this. As demonstrated by the
case law, the plan sponsor is advised to craft SPD terms that are
consistent with the plan.
A. Judicial Standard of Review
Courts must tackle the applicable judicial standard of
review for a plan administrator’s denial of benefits.274 The
Supreme Court resolved the issue back in 1989 with the
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch275 decision. Under the
facts of that case, the employer established a self-funded and
self-administered severance plan for its employee and
conditioned eligibility for benefits upon a reduction in work force
or corporate change of control.276 Upon spinning off one of its
divisions, Firestone determined there was no “reduction in work
force,” and therefore, the affected participants were not entitled
to severance benefits.277
While the district court granted
Firestone’s motion for summary judgment because the denial of
See discussion infra Sections IV.A.-G.
See Nancy G. Ross & Samuel P. Myler, Five Provisions to Reduce ERISA
Litigation Risk: Plan Sponsors Can Significantly Limit Threats, Cost of Claims by
Ensuring Plans Include These, THOMPSON’S HR COMPLIANCE EXPERT (May 2014),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/News/ef176777-7b56-4761-8b79-d54c1872df5a
/Presentation/NewsAttachment/8c916fbb-77b5-4d65-a964-ad1102d8d246/Mayer
Brown_PDF_0515.pdf [https://perma.cc/54JW-GNPK].
274 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
275 Id.
276 Id. at 105-06 (noting that Firestone established and maintained three
pension and welfare benefit plans for its employees and was the sole source for
funding those plans).
277 Id. at 106.
272
273
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benefits was not arbitrary or capricious, the Third Circuit
reversed because the employer, as plan administrator, was
a conflict of interest.278 Relying on trust law, the Supreme Court
reversed and permitted plans to grant discretionary authority to
the plan administrator, entitling the plan administrator “to
deference in exercising that discretion,” such as the abuse of
discretion standard.279 In the absence of a grant of discretionary
authority, the standard of review would be de novo.280
Under the abuse of discretion standard, the plan
administrator’s “interpretation will not be disturbed if
reasonable.”281 Its interpretation is not made “invalid merely
because [a court] disagree[s] with it, but only if it is
unreasonable.”282 In its latest decision on the topic, the Supreme
Court noted that the judicial standard of review was fashioned
to preserve a “‘“careful balancing” between ensuring fair and
prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the
encouragement of the creation of such plans.’”283 As a result,
allowing the employer to grant interpretative authority over the
plan to the plan administrator
(1) encourages employers to offer ERISA plans by
controlling administrative costs and litigation
expenses; (2) creates administrative efficiency; (3)
“promotes predictability, as an employer can rely
on the expertise of the plan administrator rather
than worry about unexpected and inaccurate plan
interpretations that might result from de novo
judicial review”; and (4) “serves the interest of
uniformity, helping to avoid a patchwork of

278 See Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1987)
(believing that the de novo standard was more appropriate when the administrator
was conflicted).
279 See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111.
280 Id. at 112.
281 Id.
282 See Hutchins v. Champion Int’l Corp., 110 F.3d 1341, 1344 (8th Cir. 1997).
283 See Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010).
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different interpretations of a plan.”284
The issue has also arisen as to whether the Firestone
deference goes beyond plan interpretation and applies to
findings of fact made by the plan administrator. Although the
Fifth Circuit has held that a plan administrator’s fact finding
decisions should always be reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard, other circuits have held to the contrary in
the absence of plan language.285
Due to the highly deferential standard of review,286
employers of non-insured employee benefit plans should confer
discretionary powers to the plan administrator to provide
deference to the plan administrator’s factual findings.
Accordingly, this standard is “highly prized by benefit plans” and
their administrators.287
Plan sponsors should consider conferring similar
discretionary authority on plan trustees in exercising their
powers. Most circuits that have addressed the issue apply the
deferential standard to trustees’ decisions where there has been
a grant of discretionary authority.288 The Eighth Circuit more
284 Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 334-35 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 215 (2004)).
285 Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1562 (5th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the administrator’s decisions as to findings of fact should always be
reviewed for an abuse of discretion); Schadler v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 388,
395 (5th Cir. 1998). But compare Torres v. Pittston Co., 346 F.1324, 1329 (11th Cir.
2003) (declining to follow the Fifth Circuit’s approach); Riedl v. General Am. Life Ins.
Co., 248 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that absent language in the plan
granting discretionary authority to the plan administrator to determine eligibility for
benefits or to construe terms of the plan, findings of fact determinations should
receive de novo review); Walker v. American Home Shield Long Term Disability
Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1068-70 (9th Cir. 1999); Kinstler v. First Reliance Standard Life
Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 249-51 (2d Cir. 1999); Rowan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
119 F.3d 433, 435 (6th Cir. 1997).
286 See supra notes 274-285 and accompanying discussion.
287 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 384 (2002).
288 Armstrong v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 446 F.3d 728, 733 (7th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the standard of judicial review of discretionary judgments is abuse of
discretion); Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 711 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding
that there is “no barrier” in using the deferential standard to a case “not involving a
typical review of denial of benefits); Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 565 (3d Cir.
1995) (following trust law for claims under “29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) based on
violations of fiduciary duties set forth in section 1104(a)”); Tussey,746 F.3d at 335.
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recently found no compelling reason to limit the Firestone
deference to benefit claims.289 Similarly, the plan and trust
documents should explicitly confer discretionary authority to the
trustees in selecting plan asset investments and plan providers,
including their related compensation.
B. Subrogation and Reimbursement Provisions
Healthcare plans usually contain subrogation and
reimbursement clauses granting the plan the contractual right
to recoup monies paid from the plan.290 The most common
example occurs when a healthcare plan pays for a participant’s
or beneficiary’s medical expenses incurred during an accident,
and then the participant or beneficiary sues the third party
tortfeasor to recover health care and other expenses incurred in
connection with the accident.291 ERISA neither prohibits nor
authorizes subrogation on the part of a healthcare plan,292 but
the Supreme Court has upheld a plan’s subrogation rights as
determined under the “catch-all” cause of action of ERISA
Section 502(a)(3).293
But compare John Blair Commc’ns, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Grp., Inc.
Profit Sharing Plan, 26 F.3d 360, 369 (2d Cir. 1994) (declining to use the deferential
standard beyond the “simple denial of benefits”); Bidwell v. Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc., 685
F.3d 613, 616 (6th Cir. 2012) (requiring no deference for claims for breaches of fiduciary duty); Futral v. Chastant, No. 13-30856 at 3, n.1 (5th Cir. 2014) (applying the
de novo standard of review to a breach of fiduciary duty claim).
289 Tussey, 746 F.3d at 335 (stating “[w]here discretion is conferred upon the
trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by
the court except to prevent an abuse by the trustees of his discretion”).
290 Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of
the ERISA Settlor/fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 459, 505 (2015) (“Health
care plans typically include provisions permitting the plan to recover the cost of
health care benefits provided to a participant who is injured in an accident and
subsequently receives an award or settlement from the tortfeasor that caused the
accident or the tortfeasor's insurance company.”).
291 Id.
292 Providence Health Plan v. McDowell, 361 F.3d 1243, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 2004)
(finding that health care plan reimbursement and subrogation provisions were
enforceable under state law and not barred by ERISA).
293 See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210-14
(2001) (denying equitable relief as the funds were not in Knudson’s possession but in
a trust required by state law); Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, LLC, 547
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A subrogation clause allows the plan to “stand in the shoes
of” the participant or beneficiary to pursue a right to recover
from the tortfeasor to the extent of the plan’s payments.294 In
contrast, a reimbursement clause, standing alone, offers no such
contractual right for the plan to pursue the tortfeasor directly,
but instead allows the plan to recover its expenses from the plan
participant or beneficiary.295 Having both provisions in the
healthcare plan permits the plan to choose how it wishes to
proceed.296 However, the plan must first pay healthcare benefits
to the participant or beneficiary in order to trigger either
subrogation or reimbursement.297 A plan’s or insurer’s ability to
enforce reimbursement or subrogation rights may depend on
whether the action is governed by federal or state laws. Health
plans that are fully insured are subject to both federal and state
laws, and some states prohibit the insurer’s right to subrogate or
reimburse.298 ERISA generally preempts state law that would
U.S. 356, 362-63 (2006) (providing equitable relief as the identifiable funds were in
Sereboff’s possession and control); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S.Ct. 1537,
1546 (2013) (denying an equitable lien over funds due to the plan’s reimbursement
provisions); Montanile v. Bd. of Trustees of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit
Plan, 136 S.Ct. 651, 657-58 (2016) (denying an equitable lien over the funds as the
defendant dissipated the settlement funds).
294 Roger M. Baron & Anthony P. Lamb, The Revictimization of Personal Injury
Victims by ERISA Subrogation Claims, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 325, 329 (2012).
295 New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v. Woodward, 363 F.3d 372, 376 (5th Cir. 2004)
(“Even if a provision mentions both subrogation and reimbursement, if that provision
gives the insurer the right to assert the actions and rights of the insured against the
tortfeasor, then the clause is a subrogation clause. A true reimbursement clause does
not allow the insurer to proceed against the tortfeasor.”) (internal citations omitted);
see also Brister v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 562 So.2d 1040, 1045 (La. Ct. App.
1990) (differentiating between a subrogation clause and a reimbursement clause).
296 See McIntosh v. Pacific Holding Co., 992 F.2d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 1993)
(nothing that a reimbursement clause “creates a contractual obligation for
reimbursement” and that a subrogation clause “deals with a statutory or
common-law right to subrogation.”).
297 See Helfrich v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 804 F.3d 1090, 1106 (10th
Cir. 2015) (“the subrogation and reimbursement requirements in the Plan are tied
directly to payments with respect to benefits. They are triggered when a third party
injures an enrollee and the Plan pa[ys] benefits for that injury.”) (internal quotations
omitted) (internal citations omitted).
298 See Med. Mut. Of Ohio v. deSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 564 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding a
California law prohibiting reimbursement of medical expenses was applicable to an
ERISA insurer); Singh v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 335 F.3d 278, 280 (4th
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prohibit a self-insured plan’s ability to pursue its subrogation
rights against the tortfeasor,299 but the courts are split as to
whether ERISA preempts state law claims by the plan against
the participant or beneficiary for reimbursement or
subrogation.300
The DOL regulations require that the SPD set forth the
“circumstances which may result in . . . forfeiture, suspension,
offset, reduction, or recovery (e.g., by exercise of subrogation or
reimbursement rights) of any benefits that a participant or
beneficiary might otherwise reasonably expect the plan to
provide on the basis of the description of benefits . . . [.]”301
Hence, the plan’s subrogation and reimbursement clauses should
be described in the SPD. The district court’s decision in U.S.
Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen302 is illustrative of the problems that
can develop if the plan and the SPD are not consistent.303 Upon
remand from the Supreme Court’s decision,304 the district court
was confronted with inconsistent terms between the plan and
the SPD.305 The plan stated that if benefits were paid from the
Cir. 2003) (finding a Maryland law prohibiting subrogation was applicable to an
ERISA HMO insurer); Smith v. Life. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1290
(N.D. Ga. 2006) (finding a Georgia anti-subrogation law was applicable to an insured
ERISA plan).
299 See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers & Emp'rs Ariz. Health &
Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a state antisubrogation law did not apply to a self-funded plan even though it had catastrophic
insurance). But compare Horrell v. CEC Entm’t Inc., No. 1:09-CV-951 at 6 (W.D.
Mich. Oct. 18, 2011) (holding that Michigan’s no-fault law which would have limited
the right of the health plan to pursue a no-fault car insurer was saved under ERISA’s
preemption savings clause).
300 See Providence Health Plan v. Skyles, No. 03:11-CV-06273-HU (D. Or. Apr. 9,
2012) (finding no preemption); Bachman v. Genesis Invs., Inc. Health & Benefit
Plan, No. 09-1212-HU, (D. Or. Mar. 14, 2011) (finding no preemption). But compare
Trustees of Drury Indus., Inc. Health Care Plan & Trust v. Goding, 692 F.3d 888,
897 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1644 (2013) (finding preemption of a state
claim against the participant’s attorney for conversion of settlement funds).
301 29 C.F.R § 2520.102-3(l) (2015).
302 No. 2:08-CV-1593 (W.D. Penn. Mar. 16, 2016).
303 Id. at 11.
304 See U.S. Airways, 133 S.Ct. at 1551 (rejecting the defenses of unjust
enrichment, the common fund doctrine or the make-whole doctrine as they cannot
overrule the terms of the plan).
305 See U.S. Airways, No. 2:08-CV-1593 at 2.
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plan as a result of an action of a third party, the plan would “be
subrogated to all rights of recovery of any [p]articipant under
this [p]lan in respect to such action.”306 The SPD stated
[i]f the [p]lan pays benefits for any claim you incur
as the result of negligence, willful misconduct, or
other actions of a third party, the [p]lan will be
subrogated to all your rights of recovery. You will
be required to reimburse the [p]lan for amounts
paid for claims out of any monies recovered from a
third party, including, but not limited to, your own
insurance company as the result of judgment,
settlement, or otherwise.307
Under the facts, McCutchen sustained injuries in an
automobile accident.308 The plan paid for the accident-related
medical expenses, but McCutchen recouped amounts from the
driver and from his auto insurance policy.309 Pursuant to the
terms of the SPD, the plan sought reimbursement of all monies
recovered, including from McCutchen’s insurance company, but
did not seek reimbursement under the plan document, as it
contained no similar reimbursement language.310 The court
declined to use the terms of the SPD and instead relied on the
terms of the plan to hold that the plan could not seek
reimbursement.311 Thus, this case is illustrative of the lesson
that the terms of the SPD should be the same as the terms of the
plan.
The subrogation and reimbursement clauses generally set
forth the kind of benefit payments that are subject to
recoupment, the type of legal interest created, and the type of
funds that are subject to reimbursement.312 This is attributed to

306
307
308
309
310
311
312

See id. at 4.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
U.S. Airways, No. 2:08-CV-1593 at 9.
See, e.g., Popowski v. Parrott, 461 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 2006).
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the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the issue.313
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue in the
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson.314 While the
Court did not reject the plan’s recoupment provision, it denied
the plan’s claim to impose personal liability on the defendants
for the payment of medical benefits, which was a claim for legal
restitution, instead of pursuing a constructive trust or equitable
lien.315 The Court emphasized that the funds to which the plan
claimed entitlement were no longer in Knudson’s possession, but
instead had been placed in a special needs trust under California
law.316
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in a recent
case, Montanile v. Bd. of Trustees of the Nat’l Elevator Indus.
Health Benefit Plan,317 where the plan sought to enforce its
reimbursement clause against a plan participant who recouped
his medical claims both in an outside settlement and through his
insurance.318 The Court declined to enforce the plan’s equitable
lien by agreement, as Monantile had dissipated the funds,
leaving the plan to recover out of his general assets, which is a
legal remedy and not an equitable remedy.319 The Court held
that to pursue a claim under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), two
elements must be present: (1) the claim alleged must be
equitable in nature, and (2) the remedy sought must be
equitable.320 While the plan alleged to enforce its equitable lien
by agreement through the terms of the plan against Montanile,
the lien could not attach to separate and identifiable funds, as
the plan administrator dissipated the funds in a way that could
not be traced.321 While the plan trustees could have enforced its
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321

See infra notes 314-332 and accompanying discussion.
534 U.S. 204 (2002).
See id. at 213.
Id. at 214.
136 S.Ct. 651, 655 (2016).
Id. at 655-56.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 657-58.
Id. at 659.
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equitable lien against the settlement funds once they were in the
participant’s possession, they did not at the time, and thus could
not later pursue a claim to recover out of the participant’s
general assets.322 The Court acknowledged that more than a
decade had passed since the Great-West decision, affording time
for plans to draft sufficient safeguards to protect their
reimbursement rights and to enforce such rights on a timely
basis.323
In the case of Sereboff v. MidAtlantic Medical Services,324
the plan sued the Sereboffs for recoupment of medical expenses
recovered from a third party in a tort action, pursuant to the
plan’s reimbursement clause.325 The Court allowed relief under
ERISA Section 502(a)(3) and enforced the terms of the plan, as
the plan sought “specifically identifiable” funds that the
Sereboffs possessed and controlled from the tort settlement.326
While the plan alleged a breach of contract and requested
money, it pursued recovery through a constructive trust or
equitable lien on specifically identifiable funds, not from the
Sereboff’s assets generally.327
While the circuits had been split on the issue of whether
common law equitable defenses asserted by the defendant, such
as the common fund doctrine or make-whole doctrine, could
prevail in light of plan language that renounces those defenses,
the Supreme Court in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen328 settled
Id. at 659-660.
Montanile, 136 S.Ct at 662 (the plan provisions required participants and
beneficiaries to notify the plan if they began legal process against third parties and
gave the plan the right of subrogation without reduction for attorneys’ fees, costs,
expenses or damages, but here the plan waited half a year to object to the
disbursement of funds by Montanile’s lawyer to Montanile).
324 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
325 Id. at 359 (the plan’s reimbursement provision “‘applies when [a beneficiary
is] sick or injured as a result of the act or omission of another person or party,’ and
requires such person who ‘receive[d] benefits’ under the plan for such injuries to
‘reimburse [Mid Atlantic]’ for those benefits from ‘[a]ll recoveries from a third party
(whether by lawsuit, settlement, or otherwise).’”).
326 Id. at 362-63.
327 Id. at 363.
328 133 S.Ct. 1537 (2013).
322
323
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the issue and allowed the plan language to prevail.329 Under
that decision, the terms of the SPD stated that if the plan paid
for benefits for any claim incurred as a result of the negligence,
willful misconduct, or other acts of a third party, the participant
or beneficiary would be required to reimburse the plan from such
recovery from the third party or any “‘insurance company as [a]
result of a judgment, settlement or otherwise.’”330 As such, the
agreement did not permit an attorney’s fees exception, such as
allowing the common-fund rule, and the court held that the
provisions of the agreement controlled and the plan was entitled
to “first claim on the entire recovery.”331 As the action was
brought under ERISA Section 502(a)(3) “based on an equitable
lien by agreement,” the terms of the plan prevailed and neither
principles of unjust enrichment or specific defenses, “such as
double-recovery or common-fund rules,” defeated the terms of
the plan.332
These cases highlight that plan sponsors should have
explicit subrogation and reimbursement rights and that a plan
should clearly refute any common law equitable defenses that a
court could consider in light of ambiguous disclaimer
language.333
Plan sponsors should also require that plan
participants and beneficiaries acknowledge the plan’s rights
through a reimbursement agreement and require notification to
the plan if any legal action has commenced. Working with
subrogation vendors, plan sponsors should make sure that
potential claims are being tracked so they can act quickly before
the participant or beneficiary dissipates the settlement funds.
C. Anti-Assignment Clause
The ERISA causes of action specifically identify the parties

329
330
331
332
333

Id. at 1543.
Id.
Id. at 1549.
Id. at 1541.
Id. at 1546-47.
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that have standing to bring such cause under Title I—namely,
the plan participants, beneficiaries, plan fiduciaries, and the
Secretary of Labor.334
There is an emerging growth in litigation where out-ofnetwork (OON) providers have alleged that self-funded
healthcare plans have systemically underpaid OON providers
through the use of networks, as OON providers are typically
paid at a lower rate than in-network providers, or not paid at all
because the services provided were not covered.335 In order to
allege standing in a cause of action for benefits, on behalf of the
participant or beneficiary, or for a breach of fiduciary cause, the
OON provider must have the participant or beneficiary assign
their rights under the plan such that the provider can “stand in
their shoes” and have standing in the cause of action.336 As
ERISA does not include medical providers on the list of
individuals who may bring an ERISA claim,337 the OON provider
must argue that the assignment of benefits signed by the

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)-(6).
See Patient Care Assocs., L.L.C. v. N.J. Carpenters Health Fund, No. 10-1669
(SRC) (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2012) (concerning allegedly improper underpayment of
benefits under a self-funded welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA because the
provider was not part of the plan’s preferred provider network); Montvale Surgical
Ctr., LLC v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., Inc., No. 12-3685 (SRC) (D.N.J.
Feb. 5, 2013) (concerning allegedly improper underpayment of benefits under a selffunded welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA because the involved outpatient
ambulatory surgery center was an “out of network” provider); Crescent City Surgical
Ctr. Operating Co., LLC v. Humana Ins. Co., No. 16-3314 (E.D. La. June 22, 2016)
(concerning the underpayment of an insurance claim by a self-funded health
insurance plan to an acute care hospital that was out-of-network).
336 See Biohealth Med. Lab., Inc. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 1:15-CV-23075KMM (S.D. Fla. 2016)
(I hereby irrevocably assign to [the Laboratories] . . . all benefits
under any policy of insurance, indemnity agreement, or any
collateral source as defined by statute for services provided. This
assignment includes all rights to collect benefits directly from my
insurance company and all rights to proceed against my insurance
company in any action, including legal suit, if for any reason my
insurance company fails to make payment of benefits due. This
assignment also includes all rights to recover attorney’s fees and
costs for such action brought by the provider as my assignee.).
337 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
334
335
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participant confers standing to sue on the participant’s behalf.338
ERISA Section 206(d) prohibits assignment of benefits by a
participant in the retirement plan context,339 but does not have a
similar rule in the welfare plan context.340 Thus, in the latter
context, whether the participant may assign his or her rights to
an OON provider is a matter of plan design.341 Therefore, plan
sponsors have begun inserting anti-assignment clauses to
prevent the participant’s ability to assign his or her rights under
the plan.342
The courts have consistently held that such
anti-assignment provisions in ERISA healthcare plans are
enforceable.343 In Griffin v. Verizon Communications, Inc.,344 Dr.
Griffin sued Verizon’s health plan for ERISA claims of unpaid
benefits, breach of fiduciary duty, and failure to provide plan
documents, asserting standing under the participant’s
338 See, e.g., Almont Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc.,
99 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1128 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“A health care provider may have
derivative standing to pursue ERISA benefits if he or she was assigned the right to
reimbursement by an ERISA plan beneficiary.”).
339 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d).
340 Id. at § 1056.
341 See Lesser v. Hartford, No. 05 CIV. 3380 (MHD) at 7 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2006)
(“welfare benefit plans are typically designed to ensure the ability of plan
participants to obtain adequate health care or related benefits . . . [a]ssignment of
such benefits . . . is thus fully consistent with [this] goal.”).
342 See Torpey v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas, No. 12-CV-7618 (JAP) (D.N.J.
Jan. 30, 2014) (where the plan’s anti-assignment clause stated that “[r]ights and
benefits under the Plan shall not be assignable, either before or after services and
supplies are provided”).
343 See Physicians Multispeciality Grp. v. Health Care Plan of Horton Homes,
Inc., 371 F.3d 1291, 1294-96 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that unambiguous
anti-assignment provisions in an ERISA governed welfare plan was valid and
enforceable); City of Hope Nat’l Med Ctr. v. Health Plus Inc., 156 F.3d 223, 229 (1st
Cir. 1998) (holding non-assignment of health care benefits under an ERISA welfare
plan as valid “consistent with the other circuits which have addressed this issue”);
St. Francis Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 49 F.3d 1460,
1464-65 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding an anti-assignment provision as that issue is
subject “to the agreement of the contracting parties”); Davidowitz v. Delta Dental
Plan of Cal., Inc., 946 F.2d 1476, 1478 (9th Cir. 1991) (enforcing an anti-assignment
clause where the parties’ intent was clear); Washington Hosp. Ctr. Corp. v. Grp.
Hospitalization & Med. Servs., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 750, 755 (D.D.C. 1991) (upholding
anti-assignment clause as it was not contrary to public policy). But compare North
Jersey Brain & Spine Center v. Aetna, Inc., 801 F.3d 369, 373 (3d Cir. 2015)
(granting standing to the provider pursuant to a patient’s assignment of benefits).
344 No. 15-13525 (11th Cir. 2016).
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assignment of benefits.345 While the court noted that ERISA
does not prohibit a participant or beneficiary from assigning
benefits to the provider, an anti-assignment provision in the
plan that limited such assignments was valid and enforceable,
thereby denying the healthcare provider standing to pursue an
ERISA Section 502(a) cause of action.346
Case law has also ruled against OON providers on the
grounds that even if they had standing to pursue an ERISA
cause of action, they did not exhaust the administrative claims
process under ERISA.347
These cases highlight that plan sponsors should insert antiassignment clauses in their ERISA welfare plans to prohibit a
medical provider from asserting benefit claims and fiduciary
breach claims against the plan. Plan sponsors should also
provide similar language in the SPD to alert participants of the
plan’s anti-assignment provisions. In the Griffin case discussed
above, Dr. Griffin argued that Verizon could not rely on the antiassignment provision because it failed to notify her of the plan’s
provision; Verizon was thus equitably estopped from relying on
the provision or having waived it.348 While the court rejected
that argument, explicit language in the SPD should prevent
such an argument in the future.349
D. Statute of Limitations Provision
Recent Supreme Court case law is instructive for drafting

345 Id. at 3 (where the plan’s summery of coverage’s anti-assignment provision
stated, “You cannot assign your right to receive payment to anyone else, except as
required by a ‘Qualified Medical Child Support Order’ as defined by ERISA or any
applicable state or federal law . . . The coverage and any benefits under the plan are
not assignable by any covered member without the written consent of the plan . . .”).
346 Id. at 4-5.
347 See Biohealth Med. Lab. v. Conn., No. 1: 15-CV-23075-KMMM at 8 (S.D. Fla.
2016); Riverview Health Inst. v. United Health Group, Inc., No. 15-CV-3604 at 8 (D.
Minn. 2015).
348 See Griffin, No. 15-13525 at 10.
349 Id.
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statute of limitations provisions within an ERISA plan.350 A
statute of limitations sets forth a period of time for bringing
certain types of causes of action.351 Under ERISA’s “Fiduciary
Responsibility” section, the law sets forth a statute of limitations
only for fiduciary breaches, prohibited transactions, and other
provisions under Part Four of Title I of ERISA, including those
brought under ERISA Section 502(a)(3).352 That limitation
concludes “six years after [either] the date of the last action
[that] constituted a part of the breach or violation, . . . or in the
case of an omission[,] the latest date on which the fiduciary could
have cured the breach of violation, or . . . three years after the
earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the
breach or violation[,]” whichever is earlier.353 A recent Supreme
Court decision addressed the statute of limitations in the context
of a breach of fiduciary duty claim involving a plan trustee’s
continued holding of an imprudent investment.354
There is no comparable statute of limitations period set
forth under Part 5 of Title I relating to enforcement, namely the
time period applicable for the filing of a cause of action for
benefit claims under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) or non-fiduciary
claims brought under ERISA Section 502(a)(3).355
Most courts have applied the statute of limitations from
analogous state laws in non-fiduciary claims.
The Eleventh
Circuit borrowed a statute of limitations from the most
analogous state law in the context of a plan pursuing
reimbursement from a plan participant who had recovered
See infra notes 369-379 and accompanying discussion.
See Grell v. Laci Le Beau Corp., 73 Cal. App. 4th 1300, 1304-05 (1999).
352 29 U.S.C. § 1113 (referring to actions with respect to a fiduciary’s breach of
any responsibility, duty or obligation or with respect to a violation under Part 4 of
ERISA).
353 Id. (but cases of fraud or concealment result in a limitation period not later
than six years after the discovery of the date of discovery of such breach or violation).
354 Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S.Ct. 1823, 1824 (2015) (reversing the Ninth
Circuit’s holding that the statute of limitations began with in the trustee’s initial
selection of the funds as ERISA requires the fiduciary to prudently monitor funds
and remove those that become imprudent).
355 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1151.
350
351
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monies from a third party tortfeasor for injuries.356 The Eighth
Circuit did the same in a similar ERISA Section 502(a)(3)
context.357 The Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, as well as
other lower courts, have used state law statute of limitations for
non-fiduciary claims.358 The courts have also affirmed the use of
an alternative period of time under the terms of the plan,
provided such period is reasonable.359
In non-fiduciary claims, the issue arises as to when the
cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes.
Normally, case law affirmed that a claim for benefit payments
would accrue after the claim was submitted and formally denied
because the plan requires the claimant to exhaust the claims
procedures prior to initiating a lawsuit.360 The Supreme Court
recently addressed this issue in the case of Heimeshoff v.
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.,361 which was a unanimous
decision upholding the plan’s statute of limitations for benefit
claims, including its claim accrual date, as long as it was
356 See Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347, 1356-57 (11th
Cir. 1998).
357 See Administrative Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. Health & Welfare
Plan v. Soles, 336 F.3d 780, 781 (8th Cir. 2003).
358 Michigan United Food & Commercial Workers Unions v. Muir Co., 2 F.2d
594, 598 (6th Cir. 1993) (a cause of action for delinquent employer contributions);
Vernau v. Vic’s Mkt., 896 F.2d 43, 44-45 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Wyo. Laborers Health
& Welfare Plan Trs. v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613, 615 (10th Cir.
1988) (same); Campanella v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Plan, 299
F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 (S.D. N.Y. 2004) (a cause of action alleging plan violations of the
participation and vesting requirements of ERISA); Gashlin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. Ret. Sys. For U.S. Emps. & Special Agents, 286 F. Supp. 2d 407, 419 (D.N.J.
2003) (a claim for equitable estoppel under ERISA § 502(a)(3)); Miele v. Pension Plan
of N.Y. State Teamsters, 72 F. Supp. 2d. 88, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (a cause of action for
declaratory and injunctive relief alleging the benefit formula violated the terms of
the plan and ERISA); DeVito v. Pension Plan of Local 819 Teamsters Pension Fund,
975 F. Supp. 258, 264 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) (a cause of action alleging the Social Security
offset to the plan formula violated ERISA), abrogated on other grounds by Dunnigan
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2002); Carollo v. Cement &
Concrete Workers Dist. Council Pension Plan, 964 F. Supp. 677, 688 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(a cause of action alleging the plan’s accrual formula violated ERISA).
359 See Harris v. The Epoch Grp., L.C., 357 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2004)
(permitting the plan’s use of a three-year statute of limitations or longer period of
time under applicable law as valid).
360 Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1980).
361 134 S.Ct. 604, 610 (2013).
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reasonable and there was no controlling state statute to the
contrary.362
The disability plan in question required
participants to bring suit within three years after “proof of loss”
was due to the plan, which was defined as ninety days after the
elimination period, the start of the period for which the insurer
would owe payment.363 After being denied her claim, the
plaintiff filed suit almost three years after the appeal denial,
“but more than three years after ‘proof of loss’ was due.”364 The
district court granted a motion to dismiss, relying on the statute
of limitations provided by the closest state statute.365
Connecticut law permitted the plan to specify a limitations
period “as long as that period is not less than one year[,]” even if
such period began to run before the claimant could bring legal
action; thus, the court held the plan’s three-year limitations
period was enforceable and Heimeshoff’s claim was untimely.366
The Second Circuit affirmed.367 The Supreme Court “granted
certiorari to resolve a split among the [circuits] [as to] the
enforceability of this common contractual limitations
provision.”368
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit.369 While
statute of limitations normally begin to run when the cause of
action “accrues” (i.e., when the plaintiff can file suit for a claim
for benefits, which in the context of ERISA cases is when the
plan issued a final denial), the Court rejected that such a rule
should apply in the context of ERISA benefit claims.370 “Absent
a controlling [state] statute to the contrary, a participant and a

Id. at 608.
Id.
364 Id. at 609.
365 Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 3:10-CV-1813 (D. Conn.
Jan. 16, 2012).
366 Id. at 7.
367 Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 12-651-CV at 5 (2d Cir.
2012).
368 Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S.Ct. 604, 610 (2013).
369 Id.
370 Id.
362
363
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plan may [contractually agree] to a particular limitations period,
even [if it begins] to run before the cause of action accrues,
[provided] the time period is reasonable.”371 Quoting from its
decision in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen,372 the Court stated
that “‘[t]he plan, in short, is at the center of ERISA’” such that
employers may draft the written terms of the plan so as to avoid
the complexity of administrative or litigation costs.373 Hence,
the parties may agree to the length of the limitations period, as
well as its commencement.374
The Court rejected the DOL’s argument in its amicus brief
that a limitations period should not begin before the internal
review is complete due to the potential of preventing judicial
review.375 It held that its ruling did not undermine ERISA, as
the parties both had an interest in participating in the
administrative process, and if the parties acted in bad faith or
delayed the process to avoid judicial review, the courts would
have various means at their disposal, like waiver, estoppel, or
tolling, to allow participants to proceed.376 The Court also
rejected the argument that ERISA regulations require tolling of
the limitations period during internal review.377 The only
circumstance in which a plan must toll the limitations period is
when the plan offers voluntary internal appeals beyond what is
required under the regulations.378 Thus, the Court upheld the
limitations period in question, as it was found to be reasonable
and not in conflict with a controlling state statute.379
Due to the flexibility provided by the Supreme Court, a plan
sponsor should consider adopting a reasonable statute of
Id.
133 S.Ct. 1537 (2013).
373 Heimeshoff, 134 S.Ct. at 611-12 (quoting U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen,
133 S.Ct. 1537, 1548 (2013)).
374 See id.
375 Id. at 613-14.
376 Id. at 615.
377 Id.
378 Id.
379 Heimeshoff, 134 S.Ct. at 612.
371
372
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limitations within its plan, including when the claim accrues.
Having the limitations period begin before the participant’s
cause of action accrues can be a powerful tool that the plan
sponsor may utilize. However, sponsors should consider having
the period begin with a specific date rather than the plan’s final
denial of the claim. As a suggestion, if the statute of limitations
period is not generous, it should be disclosed on the claims
denial notice that is usually found within the “explanation of
benefits” form.
E. Arbitration Clauses and Class Waivers
ERISA Section 502(e)-(f) vests exclusive jurisdiction for
ERISA causes of action in the federal courts.380 Such exclusive
jurisdiction does not preclude the employer sponsor’s use of
arbitration to resolve claims.381
The Supreme Court has
routinely upheld the enforceability of arbitration clauses, despite
the disparities in bargaining power, as such clauses are viewed
as a matter of contract.382 While these cases were not in the
context of ERISA plans, the Supreme Court’s holding in
Heimeshoff would support a similar ruling, as it upheld a plan’s
statute of limitations period as long as it was reasonable and not
contrary to controlling state law.383 Lower courts in the ERISA
context have upheld arbitration clauses in ERISA plans that
involve benefit claims and statutory claims.384 They have also
380 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)-(f) (with two exceptions for causes of action for benefit
claims and for QMCSO compliance, in which state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction).
381 See Jillian Mech. Corp. v. United Serv. Workers Union Local 355, 882
F. Supp. 2d 358, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing arbitration as an alternative to
litigation in the ERISA context); see also Coker v. Transworld Airlines Inc., 957
F. Supp. 158, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“ERISA was not intended to preempt the
mandatory arbitration provisions of [other statutes].”).
382
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1756 (2011);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (holding that
“[t]he duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not diminished when a party bound
by an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights.”).
383 See supra Section IV.D. discussion and accompanying notes.
384 See Comer v. Micor, 436 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the
parties agreed that ERISA claims were arbitrable); Arnulfo P. Sulit v. Dean Witter
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upheld the enforceability of an arbitration agreement’s
prohibition on class arbitration or joinder of claims.385
Plan sponsors should consider use of arbitration clauses in a
plan document to expedite and reduce claim’s litigation costs.
However, they may choose to make the plan’s arbitration
provision discretionary on the part of the plan sponsor to limit
judicial review of the arbitrator’s ruling. The best practice
would be to include mandatory arbitration provisions and
prohibitions on class arbitrations or joinder of claims in both the
plan document and the terms of the SPD.
F. Venue Provisions
ERISA Section 502(e)(2) sets forth the applicable rules to
determine the proper venue for a cause of action: (1) where the
plan is administered; (2) where the breach occurred; or (3) where
at least one defendant resides or is found.386 It is regarded as a
liberal venue provision designed to provide easy and ready
access to the federal courts.387 As such, it provides plaintiffs
with options that could lead to “forum shopping” depending on
the facts of the case and any split of authority with respect to a

Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475, 477-78 (8th Cir. 1988) (enforcing an arbitration
agreement between a customer and securities broker, hired to manage its pension
and profit sharing account, in any dispute arising under ERISA); Bird v. Shearson
Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111
S.Ct. 289 (1991) (holding that ERISA was not intended to preclude arbitration of
claims); Kramer v. Smith Barney, 80 F.3d 1080, 1084 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding the
plan’s arbitration clause binding with respect to ERISA benefit claims); and Pritzker
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 7 F.3d 1110, 1119 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding
arbitration clauses binding on fiduciary breach claims under ERISA).
385 See Jasso v. Money Mart Exp., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1049 (N.D. Cal.
2012); Sanders v. Swift Tramp Co. of Ariz., LLC, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D.
Cal. 2012); Luchini v. Carmax, No. CV F 12-0417 LJO DLB at 13 (E.D. Ca. July 23,
2012); Tenet HealthSystem Phil., Inc. v. Rooney, No. 12-mc-58 at 5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17,
2012); Hornsby v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-680-MHt at 5
(M.D. Ala. June 13, 2012).
386 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2).
387 Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussing
invocation of “ERISA’s liberal venue provision [which] was enacted to benefit plan
participants/beneficiaries”).
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given legal issue.388 An issue was raised as to whether the terms
of the plan could dictate the venue that participants and
beneficiaries would have to use in any cause of action against
the plan.389 If possible, this could mitigate the plan sponsor’s
costs of litigation.390
The Sixth Circuit in the case of Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension
Plan391 upheld the enforcement of the plan’s venue provision,
despite the DOL’s arguments in its amicus brief to the
contrary.392 In a claim for benefits, the plaintiff filed his cause of
action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky.393 The district court dismissed the complaint, as the
plan’s venue provision required a participant or beneficiary to
bring any action in connection with the plan in the federal
district court in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, where the plan was
administered.394
The Sixth Circuit held that the DOL’s
argument in its amicus brief that such venue selection clauses
were “incompatible with ERISA” was not entitled to deference,
as it was expressed solely in this amicus brief and another
circuit-court amicus brief.395 As a result, the court found the
plan’s venue selection clause to be “presumptively valid and
388 Kathryn J. Kennedy, The Perilous and Ever-Changing Procedural Rules of
Pursuing an ERISA Claims Case, 70 UMKC L. REV. 329, 356 (2001) (discussing
forum shopping resulting from ERISA section 502) (citing Wallace v. Am. Petrofina,
Inc., 659 F. Supp. 829, 832 (E.D. Tex. 1987); Foster G. McGaw Hosp. of Loyola Univ.
of Chicago v. Pension Trust Dist. #9 Welfare Trust I.A. of M.A.W., No. 92 C 4361,
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 1992); Doe v. Connors, 796 F. Supp. 214, 222 (W.D. Va. 1992)).
389 Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 922, 929 (6th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 136 S.Ct. 791 (2016).
390 Smith, 769 F.3d at 932.
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 Id. at 926.
394 See Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, No. 3-120-CV-0697-H at 3 (W.D. Ky.
Jan. 28, 2013).
395 See Smith, 769 F.3d at 926-28 (stating that “the Secretary is no more expert
than this Court is in determining whether a statute proscribes venue selection”)
(referencing the DOL’s amicus brief in this case, Brief of the Sec’y of Lab. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d
922 (6th Cir. 2014) (13-5492), and its prior amicus brief, see Brief of the Sec’y of Lab.
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Mozingo v. Trend Personnel Services, 504
Fed. Appx. 753 (10th Cir. 2012)).
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enforceable.”396 The court rejected the argument that its holding
imposed an excessive burden on ERISA litigants by forcing them
to exotic venues, as the “party may always challenge the
reasonableness of a forum selection clause.”397
Plan sponsors who opt to incorporate a specific venue
selection clause should select a forum that best minimizes
litigation over the question.
G. Reservation of Rights Clauses
ERISA case law distinguishes a plan sponsor’s action as a
settlor, as opposed to a fiduciary, for purposes of the fiduciary
rules of ERISA Section 404(a)(1).398 When a plan sponsor acts as
a settlor, its actions are not judged under the fiduciary
standards and a plan sponsor can thus wear “two hats” with
respect to a plan.399 In acting in its settlor capacity, a plan
396 Id. at 930 (unless the enforcement of that clause would be unreasonable or
unjust or the clause was invalid due to fraud or overreaching).
397 Id. at 930 (citing its case in Wong v. Partygaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 828 (6th
Cir. 2009), that set forth a three-part test to judge the enforceability of a forum
selection clause). The court states that the majority of courts have upheld the
validity of venue selection clauses in ERISA plans, citing Bernikow v. Xerox Corp.
Long-Term Disability Income Plan, CV 06-2612 RGK(SHx), (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2006);
Gipson v. Wells Fargo & Co., 563 F. Supp. 2d 149 (D.D.C. 2008); Klotz v. Xerox Corp.,
519 F. Supp. 2d 430 (S.D. N.Y. 2007); Rodriguez v. PepsiCo Long Term Disability
Plan, 716 F. Supp. 2d 855 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Rogal v. Skilstaf, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d
334 (E.D. Pa 2006); Schoemann ex rel. Schoemann v. Excellus Health Plan, Inc., 447
F. Supp. 2d 1000 (D. Minn. 2006); Smith v. Aegon USA, LLC, 770 F. Supp. 2d 809
(W.D. Va. 2011); Sneed v. Wellmark Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Iowa, No. 1:07-CV292, (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 30, 2008); Williams v. CIGNA Corp., No. 5:10-CV-00155, (W.D.
Ky. Dec. 13, 2010), but see Coleman v. Supervalu, Inc. Short Term Disability
Program 920 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill 2013); Nicolas v. MCI Health & Welfare Plan
No. 501, 453 F. Supp. 2d 972 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
398 See, e.g., Bennett v. Conrail Matched Sav. Plan Admin. Comm., 168 F.3d 671,
679 (3d Cir. 1999) (“ERISA permits employers to ‘wear two hats,’” as plan
administrator and as plan sponsor).
399 Sonoco Prods. Co. v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc., 338 F.3d 366, 373 (4th Cir.
2003) (“Accordingly, a plan sponsor is entitled to wear different hats: it may perform
some functions as a fiduciary to the plan, while it may perform other functions on its
own behalf, i.e., in a non-fiduciary capacity”); Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc. 220 F.3d
702, 718 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We have recognized that employers who are also plan
sponsors wear two hats: one as fiduciary . . . and the other as employer performing
settlor functions . . . .”); Akers v. Palmer, 71 F.3d 226, 231 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[i]t is
therefore perfectly consistent for an employer to wear ‘two hats’ and act both as a
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sponsor is wearing its “sponsor hat,” and not acting as a
fiduciary even though its actions affect the interests of the
participants and beneficiaries.400 However, when the sponsor
wears its “fiduciary hat,” it is subject to the fiduciary standards
of ERISA.401 Thus, it becomes critical to determine the nature of
the action taken by the plan sponsor to ascertain whether the
action gives rise to fiduciary obligations.
This distinction has been drawn in a trio of Supreme Court
cases—Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,402 Lockheed Corp.
v. Spink,403 and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson.404 In these
cases, the Court affirmed the right of plan sponsors to terminate
retiree welfare benefits,405 to amend a retirement plan to add
early retirement benefits,406 and to use surplus assets under a
defined benefit plan to fund benefits for a recently added group
of participants.407 This may or may not include the sponsor’s
decision regarding actual amendments or termination
processes.408 However, the Court in the case of Varity Corp. v.
Howe409 held that an employer’s misrepresentations to plan
participants about the future of plan benefits was not protected
as a settlor action, but instead was a fiduciary action.410
The lower courts have applied the Supreme Court settlor
rulings in a number of different contexts: where the employer

fiduciary and as an employer without breaching fiduciary duties.”).
400 Bennet, 168 F.3d at 679.
401 Id.
402 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995).
403 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996).
404 525 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1999).
405 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (referencing Adams v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 905
F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990), which stated “[A] company does not act in a fiduciary
capacity when deciding to amend or terminate a welfare benefits plan.”).
406 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996).
407 525 U.S. 432, 442 (1999).
408 See Amato v. W. Union Int’l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1417 (2d Cir. 1985)
(deciding that an employer’s decision to recapture plan assets could be a fiduciary
decision).
Dana M. Muir, Changing the Rules of the Game: Pension Plan
Terminations and Early Retirement Benefits, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1034, 1036 (1989).
409 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
410 Id. at 503.
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amended the plan to eliminate or create benefits for different
groups of employees;411 to set participant contributions or co-pay
clauses under a health plan;412 to amend the plan to provide
greater benefits for a limited group of participants;413 and to
amend a pension plan to cause severed employees to be ineligible
to receive unreduced early retirement benefits.414
Plan sponsors can become fiduciaries when their
responsibilities or actions make them a fiduciary. In the Second
Circuit’s decision in In re Citigroup ERISA Litig.,415 a plan
sponsor of an Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 401(k) plan
was not held to be a fiduciary for purposes of determining
whether and how the company stock would be an investment
option, because such authority had been delegated to the plan’s
Investment and Administrative Committee, and there was no
evidence that the sponsor retained or exercised such control.416
However, a district court invalidated a plan sponsor’s
amendment, eliminating Nabisco stock funds as an investment
option under the plan on the grounds that a sponsor failed to
follow the terms of the plan.417
The lessons learned from previous litigation emphasize that
the plan sponsor should make its settlor rights to amend,
411 Campbell v. BankBoston, N.A., 327 F.3d 1, 6-8 (1st Cir. 2003); Anderson v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir. 2002).
412 Voyk v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 198 F.3d 599, 604-06 (6th Cir.
1999). But see Abbot v. Pipefitters Local 522, 94 F.3d 236, 240 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that trustees of a multiemployer welfare plan did act as fiduciaries in
setting different contribution rates for different unions without amending the plan).
413 See Bennett v. Conrail Matched Sav. Plan Admin. Comm., 168 F.3d 671, 67879 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding the employer’s amendment to the plan to allocate
surplus to a given group of employees); Fletcher v. Kroger Co., 942 F.2d 1137, 113940 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding an employer’s decision to provide early retirement
benefits to a given group of employees); Belade v. ITT Corp., 909 F.2d 736, 737-38 (2d
Cir. 1990) (upholding the exclusion of a given group of participants from early
retirement benefits).
414 See Schultz v. Windstream Commc’ns, Inc., 600 F.3d 948, 951-52 (8th Cir.
2010).
415 662 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2011).
416 In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied
sub nom. Gray v. Citigroup, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 475 (2012).
417 Tatum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 1:02-CV-00373 (M.D.N.C. June 1,
2011).
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modify, or terminate the plan explicit, along with the processes
associated with making those actions. Plan sponsors should also
refrain from using gratuitous recitals in the plan document
because an adherence to ERISA’s fiduciary standards will avoid
unfavorable court outcomes.418
V. CONCLUSION
The case law makes it clear that plan documents contain
numerous instruments that govern the plan. Each instrument
should have protective provisions within the plan document to
better protect the plan sponsor and other fiduciaries. ERISA
Section 102(a) requires the SPD to be “written in a manner
calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and
shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably
apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and
obligations under the plan.”419 This assumes that there are two
documents—the plan document and the SPD.420 This may not
be the case in the health and welfare context if a vendor-drafted
booklet, rather than an SPD, explains the “terms of the plan.”
As noted in the case law discussed above, the courts contemplate
that a document can serve as both the ERISA plan document
and the SPD, if the terms of the plan so provide.421

418 See Boesel v. Chase Manhattan, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1032-34 (W.D.N.Y.
1999) (where the court was inclined to favor the defendant’s plan interpretation to
“all of the plan provisions”).
419 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a).
420 Tuttle, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 949 (discussing plan documents as a separate
conceptual entity which may be comprised of portions of other documents); Frazier,
725 F.3d at 566 (discussing plan documents as separate from plan assets before
acknowledging that a single document may qualify as both).
421 Liss v. Fidelity Employer Services Co., No. 11-2125 at 8 (6th Cir. 2013). See
also L & W Associates Welfare Ben. Plan v. Estate of Terance R. Wines, No. 12-CV13524 at 17 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 2014) (holding that the SPD is the plan document
where no formal plan document exists) and Board of Trustees v. Moore, 800 F.3d
214, 219 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that the SPD is a binding plan document that sets
forth the enforceable subrogation terms).
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